Newsletter : Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University No.76 by unknown
TitleNewsletter : Center for Southeast Asian Studies, KyotoUniversity No.76
Author(s)












004 The Military in Southeast Asian Politics: Playing or Controlling?
 Robert Taylor
007 Thai Popular Culture: A New Player in Asia Media Circulation and Chinese Censorship
 Amporn Jirattikorn
010 Conference Summary Report
 SEASIA 2017 “Unity in Diversity: Transgressive Southeast Asia”
 December 16–17, 2017 Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand
 Christina Warning, Michiko Yoshida
015 SEASIA Keynote Speech
 Celestial Axe: On the Politics of Naming
 Chaiwat Satha-Anand
026 Excavating the Hidden Politics of Land Governance in Laos
 Miles Kenney-Lazar
030 The Businessification of Civil Society
 Kevin Hewison
034 Research on Women’s Leadership in Indonesia: Women as the Source of Knowledge, New 
Narratives, and Existing Limitations (2006–17)
 Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi
038 Fresh from the Field: 
 Translated Media, Trans-regional Encounters: Experiencing India in the Lao Highlands
 Nishaant Chokski
042 Publications 
Front Cover:  Gate Grill at Preah Vihear Preah Keo Morakot (Royal Palace temple), Phnom Penh, Cambodia
                     Source: Mario Lopez
003
C




After a brief hiatus the CSEAS newsletter returns in a new digital-only format. In order to evolve and meet the 
challenges of reaching out to the global Southeast Asian academic community, our newsletter will bring more 
topical research initiatives from our Center, and faculty, as well as fellows and researchers from institutions in 
our network. Since CSEAS’s reorganization last year, faculty have been working together on new projects and 
initiatives both within and outside of Japan. 
 As of the end of March 2018, Prof. Kono Yasuyuki completed his four-year tenure as director. During 
this time, he oversaw the transition of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS) and the Center for 
Integrated Area Studies (CIAS) merge together to creater a stronger more internationally outward looking 
institution.  As of April 2018, we welcome Prof. Hayami Yoko as our new director.  Along with our vice 
directors, Mieno Fumiharu and Koizumi Junko, we look forward to deepening our commitments to multi-
disciplinary research within Southeast Asia and other regions where our researchers work.
 In this issue, we introduce a series of articles from recent fellows. Robert Taylor, writes about the 
military in Southeast Asian politics and takes a deeper historical look at civil-military relations in the region to 
question to role of military forces that have presided over nations in the region during the 20th – 21st century. 
Amporn Jirattikorn (Chiang Mai University), introduces us to the production, consumption and sharing of 
Thai television dramas within Southeast Asia and China. In recent years a huge fan industry has developed for 
Thai dramas and this article looks over recent trends in their circulation and consumption in China. 
 On 16 – 17 December 2017, CSEAS was one of the co-organizers of the second Consortium for 
Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (SEASIA), held at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. A resounding 
success, over 450 participants attended the conference from 29 nations, further cementing SEASIA’s reputation 
as a regional and global hub for scholars to come together. Christina Warning and Michiko Yoshida (Chul-
alongkorn University) offer a detailed overview of this successful event. Prof. Chaiwat Satha-Anand (Depart-
ment of Political Science, Thammasat University), was honored as one of the keynote speakers at this confer-
ence and gave a deeply thought-provoking talk on the politics of naming and the power embodied within 
names themselves. His address is carried in this newsletter.
 Miles Kenney-Lazar, a Hakubi Researcher based at CSEAS, is currently conducting research in Laos 
and provides us with an introduction to his work on politics and power relations among foreign investors, the 
Lao state, and Lao peasants shaping access to land and driving agrarian-environmental change. Kevin Hewison 
(University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), discusses current debates concerning businessification and the 
varying processes of managerialism, commodification, privatization and customerization that play out influence 
civil society and businesses. Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi (LIPI) has been conducting long-term research on 
Muslim women political leaders; in her article she provides us with a detailed overview of her current project on 
women’s leadership in Indonesia examining notions people hold of female politicians.
 Finally, Nishaant Chokshi (JSPS Postdoctoral Fellow) introduces us to some unique observations from 
a recent fieldtrip to Luang Namtha province, Laos with Associate Prof. Nathan Badenoch. Nishaant is a scholar 
who primarily works in India, however he shares with us how Laotian villagers consume a Thai-dubbed version 

















In the early years of the Cold War, the role of the military in politics became a subject much dis-
cussed in the political science literature of the day. 
This was the result of several factors. One was the 
enormous growth of the military power of the victori-
ous states, particularly the United States and the So-
viet Union, as a result of the Second World War. A 
second factor was the spate of military coup d’états 
which led to the toppling of many fragile govern-
ments in post-colonial states in the 1950s and the 
1960s. A third was the emergence of military re-
gimes, particularly in Latin America and southern Eu-
rope, who were convinced they could govern more 
effectively than the allegedly corrupt civilian regimes 
that they replaced. Given the anti-Communist foreign 
policy proclivities of most liberal capitalist states at 
that time, and the rightist political stance of most 
armies, military governments were seen by many po-
litical scientists, particularly in the United States, as a 
good thing as long as they were not in the country 
where they lived.
  The literature on military-civil relations at that time 
very much concentrated on how and why armies 
intervened in politics, from constitutionally legitimate 
persuasion of their civilian masters, through to vari-
ous degrees of assuming control of the state appa-
ratus, to the ultimate, a government run solely by the 
armed forces of a given country. These phenomena 
were all widely found in Southeast Asia. Burma expe-
rienced it first coup in 1958. That was in part at least 
semi-consensual, and the military kept to its promise 
to hand power back to a civilian government 18 
months later, thus winning much praise for its main-
tenance of constitutional norms. However, two years 
later, the army under General Ne Win seized power 
in its own name and remained in power, under vari-
ous guises, until 2011. Thailand, on the other hand, 
has experienced a near cascade of coups and con-
stitutions since 1932, at least 20 at last count, and is 
under military control today. The Indonesian army 
long played the role after independence of propping 
up civilian governments until it finally removed the 
nationalist leader Sukarno and then governed for 
many years, directly and then indirectly, until it ousted 
former General Suharto in 1998. The army in the 
Philippines, long held as a paragon of virtue for its 
strict adherence to the doctrine of civilian control, 
became politicized and highly factionalized during 
the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos and subse-
quently attempted at least 13 coups, all of which 
failed.
  Militaries in other Southeast Asian states have also 
been involved in politics but in different ways from 
those of the four states mentioned above. Before its 
defeat in 1975, the military controlled the govern-
ment of the former South Vietnam and in neighboring 
Cambodia and Laos right-wing military forces were 
deeply involved in politics until their defeat at the 
hands of revolutionary nationalist and leftist forces. 
Under the current governments of these three coun-
tries, the army is clearly a major prop of the ruling 
party. In contrast, the armies of Singapore and 
Malaysia have apparently appeared to be without 
political ambitions. This perception merely obscures 
the reality that the military leadership is deeply 
embedded in the ruling parties of those countries as 
well as their dominant ethnic communities and civil-
ian bureaucracies. And, of course, monarchical Bru-
nei’s armed forces are exclusively Malay, but the Sul-
tan maintains a 2,000 man Gurkha unit for his own 
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  After the end of the Cold War, the big research 
money was into the processes of so-called democ-
ratization as military governments fell out of favor to 
be replaced with civilian-led constitutional regimes. 
Reflecting back on the literature on civil-military rela-
tions in general and the specific situations in the vari-
ous countries of Southeast Asia based on an exami-
nation of the most recent relevant academic 
literature, I have reached the conclusion that there is 
not much new to be learned about the political role 
of the military from what was known in 1962 when 
Samuel Finer published his path finding The Man on 
Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics. 
Despite many excellent empirical studies of the politi-
cal role of the military in Thailand, Myanmar, the Phil-
ippines and Indonesia, usually couched in terms of 
the goal of “democratization,” in conceptual terms, 
despite valiant efforts by some political scientists to 
launch into theoretical discussions about structure 
and agency, elaborate statistical models, or other 
ventures into jargon, comparative political studies 
have not much more to tell us about civil-military 
relations in Southeast Asia or elsewhere now than it 
did six decades back.
  However, perhaps comparative historical studies 
might be more useful for elucidating the different 
kinds of civil-military relations we see in the region 
today. While reading round some of the literature on 
the role of the military in European history, I came 
across this quotation from Sir John Wheeler-Ben-
nett’s masterful The Nemesis of Power: The German 
Army in Politics 1918–1945. Wheeler-Bennett wrote 
in his introduction that one of the purposes of his 
book was, among other things, to show how the 
German army “... when it was mistaken enough to 
come down into the arena and to play politics 
instead of controlling them, it began a descent which 
ended in abject defeat — militarily, politically and 
spiritually” ([1953] 2005, xxxii). What he was alluding 
to was the different relationships that senior German 
military officers had with the dominant civilian political 
figures of their day in the period between the ends of 
the First and Second World Wars.
  After the First World War, in 1919, after Kaiser Wil-
helm II had gone into exile in the Netherlands, and 
the German army was near collapse, Friedrich Ebert, 
the first president of the new Weimar republican gov-
ernment, was besieged in his offices in Berlin by 
Communists and other radical leftist political forces 
which threatened to overthrow the new Social Dem-
ocratic Party regime almost before it could begin to 
govern. He turned for support against the mobs in 
the streets surrounding his office to General Wilhelm 
Groener who ordered the elite Freikorps to rescue 
President Ebert and suppress the demonstrators. 
Groener and the army thus became a silent partner 
of successive civilian governments, holding various 
ministerial positions until Groener was forced out of 
the government in 1932 by General Kurt von 
Schleicher. Von Schleicher, like Groener, was not a 
democratic and sought to rebuild Germany’s military 
power and its army’s badly damaged prestige. How-
ever, rather than standing aloof from party politics, 
von Schleicher sought to do a deal with members of 
the Nazi Party in order to defeat what he perceived 
as its radical faction. Adolph Hitler, however, having 
promised to make the army with the Nazi Party twin 
pillars of the state, gradually brought the army under 
Nazi Party control, including in its oath of loyalty not 
only a pledge to defend the German state but also 
the army’s allegiance to Hitler as the Fuhrer in his 
personal capacity. From then on, Hitler, who 
appointed himself commander-in-chief in 1941, led 
the German army to its destruction in a war many of 
the officer corps believed they could not win.
  Wheeler-Bennett does not define what he meant by 
his dichotomy of controlling as opposed to playing 
politics but the account he gives of Groener’s 12 
years of political success as opposed to von 
Schleicher’s and his successors’ failure to control a 
man they saw as an incompetent Austrian corporal 
makes clear his meaning, though one must concede 
that there is no clear line between one form of 
behavior and the other. So how does this help us 
understand the political role of the military in the four 
states noted above? On the basis of a number of 
indicators, both historical and contemporaneous, it is 
easy to argue that the Burmese and Indonesian 
armies have largely been controlling politics while the 
armies of Thailand and the Philippines have been 
playing politics.
  The frequency of coups or coup attempts and the 
number of constitutions the respective states have 
experienced is one obvious indicator. Since indepen-
dence, Myanmar has experienced two half coups, in 
1958 and 1988, and one full coup, 1962, and three 
constitutions. Indonesia has experienced one coup, 
the ouster of Sukarno in the mid-1960s, and one 
withdrawal of support from the head of state, when 
General Wiranto refused the order of President 
Suharto to suppress student demonstrations in 
1998. Suharto resigned the next day. In Thailand, on 
the other hand, the army has repeatedly intervened 
in politics, often in coalition with other political actors 
including the civilian bureaucracy, the Democratic 
Party, the judiciary, big business, and the monarchy, 
ousting governments which it felt were not governing 
in its interest. The frequency of these interventions 











involved in the day-to-day management of the state, 
despite the perception on the part of most observers 
that coups were no longer feasible after the debacle 
of the 1991 coup.
  Similarly, coup attempts in the Philippines following 
the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship have often 
been in collusion with other political actors, mainly 
members of the factionalized political elite which has 
dominated the country’s politics since before inde-
pendence. The ability of President Marcos to involve 
the army in his regime undermined its institutional 
autonomy and its distance from party politics. 
Though there have been no coup attempts in recent 
years, rumors of coups and discontent in the officer 
corps with the behavior of various presidents in 
recent years has had an unsettling effect on Philip-
pine politics.
  The Indonesian army no longer occupies the posi-
tions in government it held both before and after the 
1960s. By the time that General Wiranto refused 
President Suharto’s order in 1998, the army’s posi-
tion as a central pillar of the President’s government 
had been undermined by Suharto’s sultanistic gov-
ernment based on his family and business cronies. 
However, now in many ways, the army is stronger as 
an institution and as a political actor outside the gov-
ernment today, with its regional commands and eco-
nomic interests in place, and its hold over foreign 
and defense policies, than in the final years of the 
Suharto era. Moreover, as the army has redefined its 
role in the Indonesian state, as Jun Honna (2003) 
and others have shown, it still maintains the ability to 
serve as a politically stabilizing force, controlling qui-
etly from the shadows but with direct access to the 
President.
  In Myanmar, the army, following more than two 
decades of direct rule, put in place a constitution 
which now allows Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) that she 
heads to govern the country. However, that constitu-
tion cannot be altered without the consent of the 
army; the army has a lock on political change. Most 
clearly, it controls politics and it maintains the posi-
tion of being able to intervene in politics in the future 
should whatever civilian government comes to power 
threaten its interests or the country’s political stability.
  Today, on the other hand, the Thai army is in power 
and has been so for the past four years. Its most 
recent coup was in coalition with the monarchy and 
the death of the popular King Bhumipol and his 
replacement with the unpopular Vajiralongkong, and 
the apparently continuing political popularity of poli-
tics of the kind exemplified by Thaksin Shinawatra, 
and his elected successors which the army ousted 
from power not once but twice, poses a great 
dilemma. Can the Thai army once more establish a 
constitutional order that will satisfy both the monar-
chy and the majority of the population? The way for-
ward is far from clear.
  So what can we conclude from this effort to exam-
ine the question of civil-military relations in Southeast 
Asia and elsewhere from Wheeler-Bennett’s dichoto-
mous example? Perhaps it is that armies, like kings 
of old, as central pillars of their respective states 
should learn the lesson that successful constitutional 
monarchies learned in order to ensure their longevity. 
As summarized by Lord Castlereagh in 1815:
Tyrants may poison or murder an obnoxious 
character, but the surest and only means a con-
stitutional sovereign [or army] has to restrain 
such a character is to employ him ... the 
essence of a free state is to manage the party 
warfare, so to reconcile it with the safety of the 
sovereign ... to do this, the King [or army] must 
give contending parties facilities against each 
other, and not embark himself too deeply in any 
way. (Bew 2011, 397)
Playing politics or controlling politics may be a matter 
of degree as to “not embark ... too deeply” but that 
degree may spell success for both the army and the 
state it exists to serve and protect.
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Thai series shown on website Bilibili whose “bullet-screen” mechanism allows real-time user comments to scroll across the screen.
Thai television dramas, which have been a staple of the nation’s TV landscape for over four de-
cades, tend to be what Thai people call “lakorn nam 
nao” (polluted soaps). The namnao or polluted char-
acteristic lies in their portrayal of unreal life, present-
ing a visual grammar of lavish and luxurious settings, 
over-exaggerated acting, and melodramatic plots. In 
the late 2000s, Thai television dramas gradually 
started to gain popularity in Asia. Beginning in 2003, 
Thai dramas entered Chinese television channels, 
followed by the success of many drama series in the 
following years. For example, Battle of Angels, 
broadcast on Anhui Satellite TV in 2009, achieved 
the tenth highest audience rating of all programs in 
the first week it was released and was re-run four 
times between 2009–10 (Danaithan 2012). Following 
the success in China’s television market, the past 
decade saw the outward flows of Thai television dra-
mas expanded to Vietnam, Indonesia, Taiwan, Sin-
gapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Besides being 
exported for telecast, the phenomenon of subtitles 
created by fans in many countries has also made 
Thai dramas more widely accessible.
  The reasons for the new outward flow of Thai televi-
sion dramas in the region vary. As many scholars 
have argued, broadcasters in Asia now operate 
under the assumption of greater market fragmenta-
tion and the need to cater to niche audiences, as 
they exhibit less consumption loyalty (Lim 2008). 
Growing economies on the receiving end also con-
tribute greatly to the increasing outward flows of Thai 
dramas. In Vietnam, for example, the growing cable 
television market has fostered a high demand for 
television content. Likewise, the government’s priva-
tization of television channels (in Myanmar), the 
growth of cable television networks (in Cambodia), 
and the advance of mobile technology, combined 
with the ebb of Korean dramas, have contributed to 
the increased growth in Thai television dramas in 
these countries’ broadcasting scenes. More impor-
tantly, the notion of cultural proximity contributes 
greatly to the success of Thai dramas in these neigh-
boring countries. As for China, nationalistic fear over 
dominant Korean popular culture has led the Chinese 
censorship board to limit Korean television imports. 
This in turn gave way to more Thai imports (Danai-
than 2012). In addition, the higher quality of Thai 
television dramas over the past decade, and the low 
price of Thai drama exports, have enabled them to 
compete with the more expensive Korean television 
dramas. Danaithan (ibid.) points out that between 
2009–11, some satellite televisions in China broad-
casted about 8–10 Thai television dramas series per 
year.
Thai Popular Culture: A New Player in Asia 
Media Circulation and Chinese Censorship
Amporn Jirattikorn











Fig. 1  Thai TV dramas that been translated into Vietnamese language and sold as DVDs.
Fig. 2  Chinese fan showing a screenshot of how she watches Thai TV dramas from the fansub version on their phone. 
Fig. 1 Fig. 2
  This short essay focuses particularly on China, 
exploring the aspects of consumption among Chi-
nese audience who watch Thai television dramas 
through streaming sites and the fan-subtitle groups 
who translated Thai dramas into Chinese language. 
After making its successful entry into China’s televi-
sion market in the late 2000s, the past decade has 
seen the ebb and flow of Thai television dramas in 
China. The tightening state controls on broadcasting 
foreign media, including limiting the number of for-
eign imports, tight censorship, and viewers being 
able to identify clichéd elements in Thai dramas, 
have led to a decline in the popularity of Thai dramas 
in China (Chan 2012). While the first wave which 
began with Battle of Angels waned around 2011, 
Chan has argued that Chinese interest in Thai televi-
sion dramas was renewed through Chinese stream-
ing sites. This recent decade has seen the phenom-
enon of enthusiastic fans who obtain foreign cultural 
products, translate the text, then release subtitles for 
viewing, without asking for permission from the 
copyright holders. Recently, there are more than 10 
subtitling groups of Thai dramas on Chinese video-
sharing websites. Of these, the most popular one is 
Tianfutaiju whose translation focuses on Thai boys’ 
love series, a point I return to later.
  It should be noted that the present generation of 
Chinese audiences that watch Thai television dramas 
on the internet today differ from those of the previous 
decade who consumed Thai dramas from television. 
While audiences of the previous decade tended to 
be housewives who may passively receive what 
media industry offered to them, the audience of the 
new generation are millennials who are young, rela-
tively well-educated and live in urban areas. They do 
not passively watch whatever has been broadcasted 
but constantly search for global media content not 
available at home. The content which these different 
generations prefer also differs. The older generation 
tends to like Thai television dramas whose stories 
revolved around family relationships with melodra-
matic plot twists and over exaggerated acting while 
the younger generation prefers teen dramas whose 
stories are more related to their everyday life. How-
ever, it is not uncommon to find young audience who 
like the melodramatic stories of the Thai dramas. The 
younger audience are also drawn to Thai television 
dramas for the beauty and attractiveness of Thai 
actors and actresses who tend to be of mixed races.
  One of the most popular genres of Thai television 
dramas among the new generation of Chinese audi-
ence is “boys’ love” series. Boys’ love (BL) has typi-
cally been identified with Japanese manga whose 
stories portray two young men as the focus of a love 
interest. Most BL fans are heterosexual women, 
though it is not uncommon for BL to draw gay men 
or bisexual audience. Japanese BL manga became 
popular in Thailand around the beginning of the 
2000s. Following the popularity of Japanese BL 
manga, Thai BL literature in the forms of short stories 
or novels has been written and shared both online 
and offline. Until recently, television companies began 
to pick up this trend by producing BL television 
series. Fostered by a community of enthusiastic fans 
who work to provide subtitles of BL content in many 
different language communities, BL series from Thai-
land have increasingly become popular throughout 
Asia, particularly in Vietnam, Indonesia, and China. 
As BL is considered illegal in China for it poses a 
challenge to heterosexual hegemony, BL series from 
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Fig. 3  2Moons the Series is one of Thai BL series which has become popular 
　　　 throughout Asia.  
Thailand have become the main channel for young 
audience starved of content which has been banned 
at home.
  While internet provides a virtual space for a variety 
of youthful interest groups in China, the control over 
what citizen can see on the website has always been 
exercised by the Chinese state. The latest develop-
ment happened in July 2017 when the State Press 
and Publication Administration of Radio, Film, and 
Television (SARFT) ordered the removal of foreign 
movies and TV shows from the two most popular 
video-sharing websites, Bilibili and AcFun. Bilibili is a 
hugely popular site, originating as a video-sharing 
site for Japanese anime but gradually became home 
to all kinds of TV shows. Featuring more youthful 
content, Bilibili and AcFun have looser restrictions on 
the content uploaded and shared by users. They 
have also helped foster a community of Chinese fan-
subbers who voluntarily translated and subtitled 
most overseas content. These websites have thus 
attracted more fans than official websites such as 
Youku, Tudou, Sohu, and iQiyi. Bilibili also offers fea-
tures that tend to appeal to a younger audience, 
such as a “bullet-curtain” mechanism to allow real-
time user comments to scroll across the screen (He 
2017). After the sudden ban, Thai dramas, along 
with Korean series, Japanese anime, and American 
TV shows, were pulled from websites. Thai drama 
fans expressed their disappointment: a vast collec-
tion of Thai dramas were wiped out from the web-
sites and the most famous fan-subtitle group, Tian-
futaiju which solely translated boys’ love series from 
Thailand, also decided to stop subtitling. Some fans 
were devastated that “without Thai dramas, without 
Tianfutaiju, what would life be like?”
  The recent ban reportedly came for two reasons. 
Some maintain that the ban was part of official efforts 
to tackle piracy (ibid.). Recently, many official web-
sites such as Youku, Tudou, Sohu, and iQiyi started 
to obtain copyright for online foreign movies and TV 
shows. This may be the reason as to why the Chi-
nese government had to act upon those that violated 
copyright claims. The second reason has to do with 
censorship. The absence of domestic copyright 
means those videos shared in Bilibili and AcFun did 
not pass the government’s content censorship. Right 
before the removal of foreign content in these two 
websites, in June 2017, the Chinese government 
issued new guidelines for online broadcasting, pro-
hibiting unpatriotic and vulgar content. The latter 
specifically refers to “abnormal sexual behaviors” (Yin 
2017) which include homosexuality, adultery, one-
night stands, prostitution, sexual violence, or kissing 
and bathing scenes. One of the fansubbers of Thai 
dramas lamented that “from now on, we will have 
nothing to watch but war movies as everything else 
is banned.” As boys’ love series were the most pop-
ular genre of Thai dramas on Bilibili, they became the 
main target of the ban.
  The recent disappearance of foreign media content 
on these two video-sharing sites signifies the con-
tinuing struggle over what citizens can see on the 
websites. In China, as well as elsewhere, technology 
is changing rapidly, state and businesses also quickly 
respond to the transforming conditions. China’s ban 
on the amateur creation by fan communities begs 
the question: when the state and businesses are in 
alliance, can and will netizens, with the help of tech-
nology, find ways to escape control?
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        Conference Summary Report
The Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies in Asia (or SEASIA, pronounced “see-Asia”) was 
established in Kyoto, Japan, in 2013 as a joint effort 
of 10 leading Asian scholarly institutions. Following 
the successful inaugural conference hosted by Kyoto 
University in 2015, the second of its biennial confer-
ences (SEASIA 2017) was hosted by Chulalongkorn 
University in close collaboration with the Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), Kyoto University.
  SEASIA 2017 explored new directions in re-contex-
tualizing and re-conceptualizing Southeast Asia and 
Southeast Asian Studies. Given the decline of Area 
Studies in many Western universities, this interna-
tional conference helped establish an alternative aca-
demic environment for the study of this highly 
dynamic region. It offered a platform to discuss a 
broad spectrum of topics featuring the latest devel-
opments in our region and for further exchange and 
cooperation among scholars and others to serve the 
betterment of our societies.
  Over 450 registered participants from Southeast 
Asia, Northeast Asia, North America, Europe, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand attended the conference, rep-
resenting 29 countries and 166 institutions. They 
ranged from Masters and PhD students to profes-
sors and well-known scholars in various fields. Par-
ticipants presented 290 papers that covered a stag-
gering range of topics discussed in 58 regular panels 
and six special programs. These panels and pro-
grams spurred energetic and fruitful discussions and 
exchanges that advance research and sow the 
seeds of new approaches to cross-national and 
SEASIA 2017 “Unity in Diversity: 
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Fig. 1  Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn
cross-disciplinary issues.
  Hosting the conference was particularly meaningful 
for Chulalongkorn University, since 2017 marked the 
centenary of its establishment. Speaking of the 
importance of hosting SEASIA 2017, Associate Pro-
fessor Dr. Nualnoi Treerat, Director of the Institute of 
Asian Studies and the Chair of the Chulalongkorn 
University Conference Committee (CUCC) remarked, 
“as Thailand’s first institution of higher learning, Chul-
alongkorn University’s mission has been to serve the 
public and in this increasingly connected, vibrant, 
and evolving world, we have inevitably elevated our 
aspirations and endeavors to include international 
collaboration and service to the public in a much 
larger sense.”
  The conference was organized by the CUCC for 
SEASIA 2017, which was formed as a collaborative 
effort among three key entities on campus: the Insti-
tute of Asian Studies (one of SEASIA’s founding 
members), the Faculty of Arts, and the Faculty of 
Political Science. The committee worked closely with 
the SEASIA Consortium Secretariat at the CSEAS at 
Kyo to  Un i ve rs i t y  and  SEAS IA  Con fe rence 
Committee.
  The SEASIA 2017 Conference also received con-
siderable support and cooperation from various insti-
tutions and funders, including the Japan Foundation 
Asia Center (JFAC), the ASEAN Studies Center of 
Chulalongkorn University, CH. Karnchang Public 
Company Limited, Kyoto University, Chula Global 
Network, the Thailand Convention and Exhibition 
Bureau (TCEB), and PTT Public Company Limited.
Opening Ceremony
The Opening Ceremony was presided over by the 
Guest of Honor, Her Royal Highness Princess Maha 
Chakri Sirindhorn. Her Royal Highness reaffirmed in 
her speech that the Conference was “essential and 
meaningful to both academic circles and the devel-
opment of Southeast Asian countries.” While she 
recognized that “Southeast Asians can trace our 
backgrounds to different historical roots while we live 
in different geographic and political contexts” and 
“we have been reared quite differently in terms of our 
culture and beliefs,” she stressed that the SEASIA 
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Conference was an opportunity for all to learn from 
other societies, especially within the region. She con-
cluded that such learning and close cooperation is 
needed in order to achieve mutual sustainable prog-
ress: “to achieve successful collaboration, we need 
to know each other well and to understand our 
strength and weaknesses. With this meaningful col-
laboration, we will be able to join hands in growing 
up development plans that will result in unity in 
diversity.”
  Professor Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Director of the 
Thai Peace Information Center at Thammasat Uni-
versity delivered a keynote address on the power 
and politics of naming. From Confucius, the Bible, 
and the Qu’ran to anti-Communist campaigns and 
immigration procedures, he spanned history and 
contemporary experience to illustrate how naming, 
and resistance to being named, lay at the heart of 
power. The address highlighted the importance that 
naming has had to state interventions in Thailand’s 
politically troubled southern provinces. In offering a 
final example of how one government official owned 
his own name, Professor Chaiwat reminded the audi-
ence of the brave and clever ways that one can resist 
control.
  The ceremony ended with an official announcement 
that the next SEASIA Conference will be held in Tai-
wan in 2019, and will be hosted by the Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies at National Chengchi Uni-
versity in partnership with two other SEASIA consor-
tium members: the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies 
(CAPAS) at Academia Sinica, and the Taiwan Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Studies (TASEAS). The 
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) will host the 
conference in 2021.
  Participants had an opportunity to casually mingle 
and get to know each other better at a welcome din-
ner reception following the ceremony. The reception 
showcased Thai hospitality with various local delica-
cies and music. Performances by schoolchildren 
from the Chula Demonstration School added a spe-
cial charm to the evening.
Conference Panels and Special Programs
Under the umbrella theme of “Unity in Diversity: 
Transgressive Southeast Asia,” panels were clustered 
in 11 sub-themes encompassing a range of disci-
plines and topics, including history, law, economics, 
the environment, politics, innovation and technology, 
social transformation, literature, media, arts, develop-
ment work, linguistics and language, religion, arche-
ology, and so on. The panels were organized with an 
eye toward the socio-economic and political situa-
tions relevant in the various countries of Southeast 
Asia, but without limiting panels to country-specific 
themes. On the contrary, SEASIA 2017 encouraged 
and promoted scholars to question boundaries of all 
types in their presentations, and participants 
addressed various issues and topics keeping regional 
diversity in mind.
  One panel, entitled “Regionalization and Globaliza-
tion of ASEAN — Opportunities and Challenges,” 
was comprised of senior scholars and specialists 
who gathered in memory of the late Professor Seiji 
Naya, a key protagonist of ASEAN integration. The 
panel discussed the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), mega-regionalism, Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), investment flows, internal and external migra-
tion, and the powerful role that international trade 
has played in ASEAN.
  Another panel “New Perspectives on Southeast 
Asian Pasts,” brought together speakers and partici-
pants to discuss a wide range of approaches to his-
tory in an attempt to disentangle the history of 
ancient Southeast Asia from that of the Southeast 
Asian nation-states of the present day. Histories in 
Southeast Asia are often characterized chronologi-
cally in terms of linear historical evidence, or struc-
tured military and political achievements by their 
respective rulers, dynasties or political entities. In this 
context, Professor Sunait Chutintaranond reminded 
participants that it is important to carefully identify a 
historical narrative and its respective interpretations. 
He referred to the differences of “colonial centralist 
historical writing,” “nationalist historical ideology,” and 
“local historical writing.” Professor Michael S.H. Heng 
argued that academic research papers produced by 
Asian scholars rely too much on ideas originating in 
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Fig. 3  Performance given by the Chula Demonstration School
the West and draw too little from the cultural-intellec-
tual resources of their own history, cultures, and tra-
ditions. He also warned that emphasis on publication 
in “quality” scholarly journals, which are inherently 
biased towards the West, and the pressure to pub-
lish do not contribute to works of enduring intellec-
tual quality and that “quantity works against quality.”
  The panel on “Environment and Society” covered a 
considerable variety of socio-political and cultural 
aspects related to the change, deterioration, and 
transformation of the environment, including, but not 
limited to: food and energy security, the concept of 
private vs. public properties, and heritage conserva-
tion. One panel discussed the various challenges to 
the future of rural livelihoods in Cambodia, including 
labor migration, microfinance, and Chinese agricul-
tural investments. According to Serey Sok, a PhD 
candidate at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, 
while agricultural development is essential for the 
country, it has also led to wide economic discrepan-
cies, environmental deterioration, and increasing 
conflicts between rural communities and the state 
revolving around land-grabbing and the granting of 
economic land concessions. Such patterns are seen 
across the region.
  SEASIA 2017 organized special programs that con-
sisted of a wide variety of academic talks and more 
accessible public presentations beyond the regular 
panel sessions in order to maximize contributions 
from both the presenters and the audience. The 
roundtable sessions included discussions on timely 
and urgent matters of extremism, human trafficking 
(via a film screening and panel discussion), the rise of 
Chinese hegemony, and alternative modes of knowl-
edge production and dissemination in the post-dem-
ocratic era.
  In a roundtable entitled “Beyond Extremism in 
Southeast Asia,” the discussion explored the con-
cept of religious moderation and the implications of 
trends of extremism evident in both Buddhist and 
Muslim communities in the region today. In the con-
text of the terrorist attacks experienced in a number 
of ASEAN countries over recent years, the panel pro-
vided an overview of different types of extremism, 
which have become more multi-dimensional, and the 
development of terminology related to attempts to 
confront extremism and promote peaceful coexis-
tence. All speakers confirmed that the issue of 
extremism is one that is very complex, and cannot 
be seen solely along religious, ethnic, or political 
lines. It is necessary to understand the respective 
contexts and reasons for the formation of extremist 
groups and the use of violence. Panelists also agreed 
that it is not sufficient to simply understand the phe-
nomenon — we must also provide a solution. In 
order to identify solutions, the structures of violence 
within a society leading to oppression — the social 
and economic powers which can lead to further acts 
of violence — must be addressed. The difficulty of 
how to deal with former members of extremist 
groups, currently a challenge in several Southeast 
Asian countries, was also discussed.
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The enthusiastic response to the Call for Proposals 
and the diverse range of participants in SEASIA 2017 
demonstrated that scholars are eager for, and appre-
ciative of, opportunities to exchange and network 
across disciplines at international conferences in the 
region. Area studies remain robust. However, do we 
have a broader vision of where Southeast Asia, and 
the study of it, as a region, is heading within broader 
contemporary contexts of globalization? What are 
the roles of academics in steering the direction of our 
societies? The collaborative efforts of SEASIA initia-
tives will continue to drive forward interdisciplinary 
approaches to such inquiry and, in the words of one 
participant, “produce works that have enduring value 
in the service to humankind.”
Comments from Participants
“This conference is a great opportunity for sharing, learning and 
discussion, to create a development dialogue for a better 
ASEAN community.”
Sok Serey, Cambodia
“This conference expanded my horizon of Southeast Asia. I 
learned a lot of new academic information about this emerging 
area in the world.”
Cui Feng, China
“SEASIA is a great platform to learn about new ideas and 
approaches of a diverse spectrum of Southeast Asian topics.”
Linda Kencana, Indonesia
“I like the concept of the SEASIA Conference because there are 
many diverse research topics and it is a tremendous place for 
networking.”
Chansatith Chaleunsinh, Laos
“I love attending Southeast Asian conferences because I want 
to know how Southeast Asians talk about themselves.”
Maria Florendo, Philippines
“The SEASIA 2017 Conference offered a great platform for 
people among or outside ASEAN to share their professional 
perspectives in all fields.”
Yan Ting Huang, Taiwan
“It is a fantastic forum to update oneself on what is going on in 
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        SEASIA Keynote Speech
A Chinese Woman with Two Names1)
When she left Swataw in Southern China, she was 
with her first child and so very happy to travel to the 
Golden Khersonese at the behest of her beloved 
husband. Upon arrival, the twenty something young 
Chinese woman encountered the Thai state in 
human form. She was asked a most common ques-
tion by an immigration officer: “what is your name?” 
Most people could imagine the atmosphere of being 
asked a question by a representative of the state 
when h/she sets foot in a foreign land for the very 
first time. The name of the woman was “Khow 
Nuang Cheng.” Her husband’s name was “Ung Kia 
Siew.” In the presumably confusing exchange that 
followed the question, her name was bureaucratically 
changed in an instance at the powerful hand of the 
Siamese state into “Ung Khow See.” The sovereign 
power of the state could be seen on a peron’s iden-
tity in the act of naming despite the fact that both 
“Ung” and “Khow” are family names, and that a Chi-
nese person should have only one family name. And 
so the “new” Chinese woman with two family names 
was magically born in a land she would call home for 
the rest of her life at the hand of the Thai state.
  I wonder what Confucius would have said, had he 
miraculously witnessed the destiny of this Chinese 
woman? Let’s read his Analects together.
Confucius
When a student asked the Master: if a state ruler 
asked Confucius to help rule a dominion, what would 
be the very first thing that should be done? Confu-
cius said the state had to deal with “names” first. The 
Analects (Book 13, 3) reports this unusual conversa-
tion as followed: 
Zilu said: “if the Lord of Wei were waiting for you 
to run the government, what would you give pri-
ority to?” The Master said: “What is necessary is 
to rectify names, is it not?” Zilu said: “if this were 
to take place, it would surely be an aberration of 
yours. Why should they be rectified?” The Mas-
ter said: “How uncivilized you are. With regard 
to what he does not understand the gentleman 
is surely somewhat reluctant to offer an opinion. 
If names are not rectified, then words are not 
appropriate. If words are not appropriate, then 
deeds are not accomplished. If deeds are not 
accomplished, then the rites and music do not 
flourish. If the rites and music do not flourish, 
then punishments do not hit the mark. If punish-
ments do not hit the mark, then the people have 
nowhere to put hand or foot. So when a gentle-
man names something, the name can definitely 
be used in speech; and when he says some-
thing, it can definitely be put into practice. In his 
utterances the gentleman is definitely not casual 
about anything.”2)
Celestial Axe: 
 On the Politics of Naming
Chaiwat Satha-Anand












For Confucius, names and naming are the most 
important aspects of governance because this is 
where all political orders begin. He explained that 
without attending to “names,” communication is not 
possible (“Words are not appropriate.”). If communi-
cation fails, then affairs of the state cannot be carried 
out. Virtues, civilized practices, and justice will soon 
vanish (“Punishment does not hit the mark.”). With-
out justice, a polis can no longer be a home for citi-
zens because no one would know how to live as 
one. In short, with naming flows power and political 
society was born. But is this merely a Chinese story? 
I wonder?
  This keynote address is an attempt to understand 
the power of naming things/phenomena/people and 
argues that the politics of naming is earthshakingly 
powerful not unlike the notion of a “celestial axe” 
once proclaimed in Thai legal history. I begin by 
briefly discussing the academic landscape on “name” 
and “naming.” To illustrate how changes in names 
engender political reality in terms of the state and its 
power/governability, recent research on Southern 
Thailand about a seemingly bland government labor 
project; the present peace process operation; and a 
local shaman’s ritual of communicating with the dead 
locally practiced in Pattani, will be examined. Ancient 
wisdom namely: the Bible’s narrative of exorcism, 
and the Qur’an’s creation story will then be used to 
illuminate how the power of naming works. This 
address ends with two stories: the notion of a “celes-
tial axe” as a description of the state’s naming power 
and a story of resistance as a critique of the seem-
ingly omnipotent politics of naming.
Dictionary
Ashis Nandy is a most prominent intellectual in con-
temporary India.3) When we met some ten years ago, 
I asked him what he was doing. He answered: “I am 
writing a dictionary.” I found his strange answer per-
plexing.4) Then in 2012 while attending another aca-
demic conference in Boston, I went to visit another 
old friend, the late Gene Sharp, the world-renowned 
pioneer of nonviolent struggle studies. In our lun-
cheon conversation, I asked him casually what he 
was doing at the time. Sharp answered with a smile: 
“I am writing a dictionary.” His answer stopped my 
other questions.5) Why is it that these noted world 
academics have been producing books containing 
words called “dictionary”?
  When the famous author Jhumpa Lahiri was 20 
years old, she went to visit the magnificent Uffizi 
Museum in Florence, Italy. When her sister lost a hat 
there, she tried to communicate with an Italian guard 
to help retrieve the hat using the only book she had 
at the time, an English-Italian dictionary. When the 
hat was finally found, she felt as if she had success-
fully ventured into an uncharted territory. She was 
grateful because the dictionary had become her 
guide. It protected and explained everything for her. 
It was both authoritative and indispensable, not 
unlike holy books full of mystery and revelations.6)
  Perhaps one of the reasons why these intellectuals 
spent their valuable time “writing” dictionaries is 
because the twenty-first century world is different 
from its predecessor. While the twentieth century 
world framed life struggles clearly as the battle 
between the colonizers and the colonized, the supe-
rior “race” and those who were dominated, the 
exploitative elites and those exploited, or even the 
developed against the underdeveloped, the present 
world faces much more ambiguous conflicts. Often it 
is the tension between those who speak the lan-
guages of law and rights to show their caring for the 
world and those who cannot or will not accept such 
languages. As a result, the right to punish and 
destroy the whole state identified as “rogue,” “evil,” 
or “outlawed” sometimes comes from a judgment 
made by something called: “the international com-
munity.” These languages are used to convey how 
one cares for the world.7)
  Kasian Tejapira, a prominent political scientist from 
Thammasat, gives a most succinct rationale why it is 
important to produce a “definitive” book of words. 
He explains that a society has a way to put a spell 
around some discourse demons as lexica non grata 
because it is believed that by controlling words, 
meanings, and thoughts, people will also be duly 
controlled and in that order. In this sense, writing a 
dictionary can be construed as an attempt to fix the 
words with meanings endowed by its author, believ-
ing that these words dictate people’s thoughts.8)
  But there are two other important points. First, that 
a word is present or absent in a dictionary is by itself 
a marker of its power. A word that is absent from an 
established dictionary seems to be weaker in terms 
of its legitimation function, defined as a right to tradi-
tionally exist in such a language, than the one that is 
present. Second, controlling people’s thoughts with 
words is different from using laws or force to perform 
similar functions. Laws and force with instruments of 
violence are both visible and not unrelated, because 
law exists under the spectre of punishment. Failure 
to follow laws warrants punishment, oftentimes 
through various instruments of violence. Thought 
control through words, on the other hand, is both 
difficult to see and easier to accept, sometimes 
unconsciously. Through the popular use of words, a 




enter for Southeast Asian Studies K
yoto U
niversity
  This address is not exactly about “words,” but 
“names.” Although names are words, they are not 
exactly the same. In the classic philosophical text on 
the issue, Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke devel-
oped a theory of reference that significantly distin-
guished rigid and non-rigid designators, which also 
means separating the actual (and the singular) from 
the possible (and many) worlds. To say, for example, 
that the military stages a successful coup in Thailand 
is not necessarily true because there are possible 
worlds in which it could be unsuccessful. But Kripke 
would argue that a rigid designator or name, such as 
the statement “General Prayuth staged a successful 
coup in Thailand” inflexibly connects to the same ref-
erent in all possible worlds.9) However, here is not the 
place to follow Kripke into some metaphysical argu-
ments resuscitating the notion of essence. Let me 
follow Hun Sen instead.
Hun Sen
I n  May  2016,  the  Cambod ian  government 
announced that all media in the country must call 
Prime Minister Hun Sen by his official name: “Sam-
dech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen.”10) The 
Cambodian Ministry of Information issued an order in 
early July 2016 that it would revoke work permits of 
any journalist who failed to follow its order, and did 
not call the Prime Minister by his official name espe-
cially when first referred to him in the news. However, 
on July 8, 2016, Hun Sen wrote in his personal 
Facebook that journalists were not required to write 
the official name of the government leaders in full.11)
  Hun Sen must have thought that the “name” he 
wanted to be called is significant precisely because 
he might want to be far more than a common Cam-
bodian Prime Minister. The preferred official name 
consists of four words including the Prime Minister’s 
proper name. The three prefixes connect the name 
Hun Sen to three sources of power in Cambodian 
society, namely: court power (Samdech), bureau-
cratic power (Akka Moha Sena Padei), and elemental 
or supernatural (Techo meaning heat from fire) power. 
The question in this keynote address is not why 
“names” are important, but what kinds of power hide 
behind names used, such that an already powerful 
country leader would dictate that his/her chosen 
name be used among the state citizens and foreign 
media?
Necronominalism
William Godwin was an atheist who believed that a 
human’s death is final with no heaven or hell waiting 
for anyone in the beyond. But when his wife, Mary 
Wollstonecraft12) died, he wrote in Essay on Sepul-
chres: Or, a Proposal for Erecting Some Memorial of 
the Illustrious Dead in All Ages on the Spot Where 
Their Remains Have Been Interred (1809) that the 
burial place of the dead should be identified by 
names and located in a map not unlike places of 
famous battles, something like an “Atlas of those 
who Have Lived, for the Use of Men Hereafter to be 
Born.”13)
  Godwin wrote this at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century. That century saw an enormous loss 
of life in the American Civil War (1861–65), claiming 
more than 620,000 lives, a number approximately 
equal to the total American fatalities in the Revolu-
tion, the 1812 War, the Mexican War, the Spanish-
American War, World War I, World War II, and the 
Korean War combined. Twice as many Civil War sol-
diers died of diseases such as measles, mumps, and 
small pox, among others.14)
  But what is important besides the number of dead 
soldiers was the manner of their deaths. They were 
thrown into burial trenches, stripped of every identify-
ing object, blown to pieces by artillery shells, and 
their bodies or what left of them, were devoured by 
beasts or time. These soldiers perished without 
names and could be identified only with the word 
“unknown.” During the war, there were efforts by 
groups such as the Christian Commission and the 
Sanitary Commission in the North, the Louisiana Sol-
dier Relief Association in the South, as well as indi-
viduals who had worked tirelessly to provide informa-
tion as to whether a soldier was alive or dead. Such 
information served as a consoling certainty for fami-
lies caught in endless bereavement. They felt the 
unrecognized loss intolerable in an age when family 
ties were celebrated. Faust writes, “At war’s end, the 
United States would embark on a program of identi-
fication and reburial that redefined the nation’s obli-
gation to its fallen, as well as the meaning of both 
names and bodies as enduring repositories of the 
human self.”15)
  With the atrocities of the nineteenth century and 
two World Wars in the twentieth, as well as deaths at 
the hands of governments during the Nazi and other 
regimes, the world has entered into a new age some 
called the age of necronominalism. It is an age where 
people feel the need to know the names of the fallen 
to preserve the memories of the once living. I believe 
that the age of necronominalism is closely related to 
the growing academic interest in memory studies.
  It goes without saying that there are several meth-
ods of studying names.16) In the twenty-first century, 
the internet world has turned out to be an extraordi-
nary social space. Studying names used in cyber-











those used in the non-cyber world. Importantly, the 
names used in cyberspace are chosen by their own-
ers while most people’s names are given by their 
parents. It is also important to note that since people 
in cyberspace are virtually connected, communica-
tions among them are not face-to-face. Instead, their 
online names become their “faces” in place of iden-
tity. Internet name connection works as a medium 
that at once conceals the person’s self while allowing 
connection to be possible.17) Importantly, those who 
study cyberspace names believe that a name does 
not merely function as a superficial word which has 
very little to do with the qualitative existence of the 
thing/person the name refers to. On the contrary, 
recent studies on the subject maintain that names 
represent profound identities of people and things. A 
name works as an object of connection and depen-
dence while reflecting communal values and tradi-
tions. Oftentimes names in cyberspace work to iden-
tify who are the “in-group” or “outsiders.” In this 
sense, a name is not merely a referential sign, but the 
social appearance endowed with cultural and linguis-
tic legacy.18)
  Since a name represents the user’s identity, naming 
or erasing a name in a particular context could pro-
foundly reflect cultural politics of the time. Naming a 
person or a place is not an innocent labeling act. 
Instead, it contains complicated power relations 
often times born out of fierce spatial and ethnic iden-
tity contestations. For example, while there are more 
than 800 streets named after Martin Luther King Jr. 
in the US, mostly in Southern states with a sizable 
African American population, there has been a vigor-
ous debate about who has the power to name a 
street and whose name is entitled to become a street 
name in Kenya? The governor of Mombasa, Hassan 
Joho who is an opposition leader, named a street 
after his son. The government was furious. It claimed 
that the opposition has no right to name a street 
after the governor’s relatives. But this debate took 
place in the context of a political society that saw its 
first modern president Jomo Kenyatta named an 
important street, a university, a building, a hospital, 
and an airport after him. Some were even named 
after Kenyatta’s favorite wife’s name. But then the 
fact that an opposition leader could name a street 
after his son’s could mean that the country’s power 
relations have indeed shifted.19)
  What would the politics of name changing look like 
in the context of violence such as contemporary 
Southern Thailand?
Labor Graduate20)
Two years after the new round of violence exploded 
in the Deep South, governments tried to find ways to 
deal with it. General Surayud Julanont’s government 
approved a special economic development zone in 
the five border provinces: Yala, Pattani, Narathiwas, 
Satun, and four districts of Songkhla (Jana, Tebha, 
Sabayoi, and Na thavi). The Ministry of Labor has 
been given a role to care for local people’s wellbeing 
by improving human potential among the working 
age population. The government has come up with 
specific measures both to motivate people to con-
tinue living, working, doing business in the restive 
areas, and to provide employment assurance to 
ensure steady income for the locals.
  The Ministry of Labor has devised a program to 
create jobs and fast track employment in the area. 
On April 25, 2007, the cabinet approved a project to 
hire university graduates to become “Volunteer 
Buddy Labor Graduates.”21) Four years later, the 
project’s name was changed into “Labor Graduates.” 
The Ministry explained that the name change was 
necessary for the sake of organizational clarity and to 
be different from other agencies. In 2013, the area 
covered by the project expanded to establish labor 
centers in every district. There were “Labor Gradu-
ates” working in all 37 districts while the number of 
the graduates increased. Another project to improve 
labor service efficiency was also created.
  The “Labor Graduate” project exists in accordance 
with government policies as well as national strategy. 
Government policy at the time followed the Govern-
ment Administration Plan (2012–15). One of the 
urgent policies (no. 1.5) is to best try to bring about 
peace and safety in human life and property back to 
the restive area. One of the national strategies (no. 4) 
is to create balance and adjust government sector’s 
administration. This is done following principle num-
ber 29 on solving the security problems in the local 
area as well as in ASEAN. Item 29.1 then directs all 
government agencies to integrate security and devel-
opment operations in the border provinces as 
directed by the National Security Policy (2012–16).
  To simplify this complex chain of command, I would 
say that the name “Labor Graduates” is used to call 
a project designed to improve labor services in the 
restive area in accordance with national strategy. The 
Ministry of Labor has been assigned to oversee the 
project and implement these policies and strategies 
using the offices of provincial labor in Pattani, Yala 
and Narathiwas. But when the name “Labor Gradu-
ate” appears on the administrative lines bureaucrati-
cally linking plans, policies, and strategies (ministerial 
and national), it was magically transformed into a 
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project under supervision by different layers of gov-
ernment agencies, brimming with bureaucratic power 
(Fig. 1).22)
  But what do these Labor Graduates do? Their job 
description says they provide services in labor affairs. 
But their “real” work is to reconnect the state with 
the local people in a trust building project. Violence in 
the South during the past decade has significantly 
robbed the region of the trust the locals might have 
had in the state and its agencies. The researcher of 
this project told me that the labor graduates have 
been quite successful in restoring such trust. Though 
there certainly are many factors that could explain 
such success, I would argue that its name is a pow-
erful factor. The people using this name are edu-
cated, they are university graduates, and they are 
there “to help us better our lives with jobs.” The 
name “Labor Graduate” they carry with them is so 
bland, so harmless and so very apolitical. In just such 
a context, these are perhaps conditions necessary to 
efficiently undertake a most political function in any 
political society, the production of trust between the 
state and the people.
(Happy) Peace Talk23)
The Yingluck Shinnawatra government began an offi-
cial “talk” between the Thai government and the 
southern insurgents in early 2013. This was generally 
known as “Southern Border Peace Talk Process.” 
The word “peace” was commonly used after both 
sides signed a consensus document. The then 
National Security secretary general, Lt. Gen. Para-
dorn Pattanathabutr signed the document for the 
Thai side, while Hasan Tayyib did so for the insurgent 
side. One month after the National Council for Peace 
and Order (NCPO) under General Prayuth Chan-
ocha staged a coup d’etat against the Yingluck gov-
ernment on May 22, 2014, a new southern border 
operation center designed to solve the “southern 
problem” began its first meeting on June 30, 2014, 
chaired by General Udomdej Sitaputra, assistant 
army commander and secretary general of NCPO. 
The meeting decided to change the Thai name of the 
peace talk process from “Southern Border Peace 
Talk Process” to “Southern Border Peace Talk 
Process.”24)
  General Prayuth did not want the talk process to be 
called the Santiparb (peace) talk. So he ordered the 
process to be changed into Santisuk (peace) talk. 
The last sentence in the above paragraph is not a 
typographical nor my editorial error, but a curious 
translating fact. This is because the word peace in 
English could be translated as santiparb or santisuk. 
If one is to translate the name of the talk process lit-
erally, then santi comes from shanti meaning peace 
or tranquility, and suk or sukka is happiness. The 
exact new name of the talk process should be 
“happy peace talk process.”
  As a result of this name change, all official docu-
ments after that including high level commanders’ 
orders, or policy papers, the name of the talk has to 
change from santiparb to santisuk. All policy, strate-
gic, and planning documents must be synchronized. 
The word santiparb was deleted and replaced with 
santisuk. For example, the Prime Minister issued a 
Fig. 1 Graphic Chart of Labor Graduate relations. Prepared by Chaowat Moolpakdi, a research assistant with the Strategic Nonvio-











Prime Ministerial Order 230/2014 dated November 
26, 2014 on “Establishing driving mechanism for the 
Southern Border Happy Peace Talk Process.” This 
PM Order, together with the Southern Border Prov-
inces Administrative and Development Policy (2015–
17) are considered important policy instruments giv-
ing direction to the talk process with those who “hold 
different views” from the state.
  There were all kinds of explanations about this 
peace talk process name change. The Internal Secu-
rity Operation Command (ISOC) spokesperson 
explained that this change of name from “peace” to 
“happy peace” was done so that it would fit with the 
common understanding of locals.25) A member of the 
southern civil society groups maintained that this 
change of name was necessary for the state “to 
resume control of the talk so that it won’t fall into the 
separatists’ game plan, and turn the local people to 
talk about their genuine happy peace.”26) But the offi-
cial explanation for this name change first came 10 
days later from a high ranking officer attached to 
ISOC, Col.Wicharn Suksong. He said the govern-
ment changed the name of the talk process into 
“happy peace” because “Some argue that Barisan 
Revolusi Nasional (BRN) wishes to escalate the 
issue. We want to de-escalate both the problem and 
the level of the talk. We maintain that this is our 
domestic problem. There are no warring parties in 
the area. There is no country at war. The soldiers 
who came to the South, they are doing their jobs in 
enforcing the law, and not to wage war. Therefore, 
we call it ‘happy peace talk.’ But whatever name it 
takes is unimportant. Moving the process forward is 
more crucial.”27)
  If there is anyone who would truly disagree with the 
above official briefing, and maintain to the contrary 
that “name is so very important,” that person would 
be General Prayuth Chan-ocha. The NCPO leader 
prohibited people from using the name “peace.” In 
an interview with the press on January 28, 2015, he 
said:
“... please do not use this issue to pressure the 
officials or the state... it will only put us in a disad-
vantageous position. We have to solve this prob-
lem step by step, leading military measures with 
politics. The government formulates policy and 
the whole process. The government must be firm 
and show sincerity in creating happy peace. 
Don’t use the word ‛peace’ (santiparb) because 
there was no armed fighting. This is only about 
(people) breaking the laws and (the government) 
enforcing the laws. If there is an armed fighting, 
that’s between two parties... using forces to take 
over towns to fight each other. Then it is ‛peace 
talking’. Using forces from here and there to put 
down (the enemy), to stop the violence. But I 
don’t want us to go there. We don’t want foreign 
involvement... so do not mix them up.”28)
For General Prayuth, and perhaps for the military in 
general, the word “peace” is the exact opposite of 
“war and (armed) fighting.” For the military, “peace” is 
understood as a state of no war. If southern violence 
is treated as war, the chance of containing it as inter-
nal conflict will be undermined. Most important is 
that this change of name of the talk process into 
“happy peace” is to limit the problem within the con-
trol of the Thai government. Understood from within 
the military sector, the exact opposite of “happy 
peace” is the state of no laws (and order). Working 
towards “happy peace” enables the military to deal 
with illegal acts by enforcing the law. The name 
change from “peace talk” to “happy peace talk” is 
not only a measure to ward off foreign influence on 
the conflict, but also to systemically solve the prob-
lems, reconceptualized militarily, from the policy level 
to the operational, and tactical levels. This is perhaps 
his understanding of the once famous “leading mili-
tary measures with politics” method of conducting 
conflict that will put “us” in an advantageous position 
as understood by the general. However, I do not see 
what currently happens to mitigate deadly conflict in 
the South as the “leading military measures with poli-
tics” method. I would call the present government’s 
way of conducting this deadly conflict as: “leading 
military measures with governance using laws as the 
main instrument.”
  What General Prayuth has done was to officially 
rename the peace talk process. This official renaming 
indicates a certain amount of symbolic capital along-
side hegemonic power to force the advent of sym-
bolic process. His official naming effort is possible 
because his support comes from different corners in 
Thai society. But then normally such name changing 
will be possible when the effort is collectively sup-
ported, backed by some levels of consensus. More-
over, the new name should be in line with people’s 
common sense. In this case, the renaming effort 
came from someone who many believe to speak on 
behalf of the state, the entity that monopolizes legiti-
mate symbolic violence.29)
  I am curious about the level of legitimation required 
to change the name of the talk process in pursuit of 
peace amidst southern violence. The present gov-
ernment suffers from legitimation deficit, both in 
terms of its authority to manage the precarious 
southern space, and its legitimate source of origin 
because the government was born from a coup 
d'etat. Conversely, this name change was done on 
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the basis of bureaucratic legitimation since the prob-
lem of southern violence has long been left in the iron 
hand of military bureaucracy, with or without a coup, 
by governments both civilian and military. It would be 
interesting to see how far reaching this bureaucratic 
power over names and naming could penetrate into 
the socio-cultural fabric of the Deep South. To wres-
tle with this question, I believe we have to examine 
the dark world of spirits.
Name of a Ghost30)
To study Malay Muslim ethnicity in Southern Thailand 
in the context of Islamization and the Thai state 
power, an anthropologist chose a 150 year-old fish-
ing community some 50 km from the center of Pat-
tani as his research site. Among his treasure trove of 
data, I find a most fascinating episode where he 
recounted what he saw in the rite to connect the liv-
ing with the dead performed by a Malay Muslim sha-
man, Bomoh. He told the story of a woman named 
A-isha whose father just passed away. One night her 
father came to her in her dream and told her that he 
was suffering and could not join Allah because of his 
unsettled debt with a friend. A-isha wanted to settle 
the debt with this friend to appease her dead father, 
but she didn’t know the name of this friend. So she 
went to see a Bomoh to ask for help in communicat-
ing with the dead.
  The 60-year old Bomoh asked A-isha about her 
father’s life story and his name, as well as his favorite 
local folk arts. With the information from A-isha, the 
Bomoh began his rite. His body shook. Then he 
turned himself into a shadow master. After a while, 
he was tired and the spirit did not come to be in 
communion with him. People witnessing the rite 
began to talk. Some were worried about what could 
have gone wrong since normally the rite did not take 
this long. Then the Bomoh concluded that A-isha 
gave him a piece of wrong information. She told him 
the Malay (Muslim) name of her father. A-isha was 
asked to write down the name of her father again, 
but this time it was his Thai name exactly as in the 
official house registration. With the “correct name,” 
the exact same rite was performed. This time, the 
spirit came to the Bomoh very quickly. In the daugh-
ter’s conversation with her father, whose spirit was 
now in Bomoh’s body, she asked him why he used 
the Thai name. The spirit answered: “Ayah (Father) 
already changed my name. Ayah must be Thai. I did 
not come at first because the name in Malay was not 
mine.”31)
  The anthropologist’s explanation about the strange 
behavior of the Malay Muslim ghost who preferred to 
be called by his Thai name is that in this case the 
Thai name, according to official house registration, 
represents state’s power. The state’s power in this 
case is flexible enough to accommodate traditional 
Islamic teachings that eventually would make it pos-
sible for A-isha to know the name of her father’s 
creditor, paid the debt, and presumably sent her 
father into his preferred state in the beyond.
  For me, this fascinating story of spirit possession 
reflects how the hegemonic power of the Thai state 
and its presence are represented in the official Thai 
name insisted by a ghost. That the official name 
must be used in life transaction, economic and oth-
erwise is not surprising. Some would even assess 
the success of state power by looking into the 
degree to which state power could penetrate into the 
socio-cultural fabric of a community. But in this case, 
I would say that the long arm of the state is so 
ghostly powerful that it stretched into the world after 
death, and made its presence felt within the con-
sciousness of a ghost whose identity as a Malay 
Muslim has all but gone, and the official conscious-
ness of being a Thai was burned deep into his self. 
Even the power of death could not render the Thai 
official name void to allow his original Malay Muslim 
name to take control. This is an amazing feat of state 
power in recognizing a name that is without limit, 
certainly not only in the life of its citizen, but also in 
death by the dead himself.
  Believing that the “correct” name of the spirit is the 
primary condition for a successful communication 
with those who live beyond the realm of the living is 
not a specific case prevalent only in the Malay world. 
I would say that such practice has thousands of 
years of history of the occults behind it not only in 
Southeast Asia.
“My name is ‘Legion’”
Since the middle of the third century, the Catholic 
Church allowed some priests to perform the rite of 
exorcism. The possessed, with an evil spirit inside, 
curled their bodies violently, exhibited uncontrollable 
rage, or vomited profusely because it was/is believed 
that the evil spirit entered the human body through 
natural body holes, and needs to be expelled through 
them. In some medieval paintings depicting the rite, 
the possession ended when the saints or the priests 
successfully performed the rite and “black demon” 
can be seen disgorged from the mouth of the pos-
sessed.32) In modern times, most people believe that 
these unusual bodily performances are symptoms of 
epilepsy. The rite, if carried out, could therefore be 
appreciated for its symbolic function, which could 
help the possessed/sick feel contented. The rite 












  But my interest here is not to ask “what causes 
demonic possession? Is it because the evil spirit is at 
work, or a result of epilepsy?” I am interested, how-
ever, in the ways in which exorcism has been carried 
out in Christianity? And how does it work?
  To deal with this question, it is important to invoke 
the authority of the Bible, specifically the New Testa-
ment. In his short life, Jesus’ miracles included how 
he healed the paralyzed (Matthew 4, 24–25); the 
blinded (John 9, 2–11); the leper (Matthew 8, 2–4), or 
resurrected the dead (John 11, 37–44). But there 
were times when he exorcised the demons possess-
ing humans (Matthew 4, 24; Mark 9, 17–27). What 
follows is a case which appears in the gospels.34)
  When Jesus and his disciples crossed the lake to 
the territory of Gerasenes, a man possessed with “an 
unclean spirit” came towards him. This man lived in 
the tombs, and could no longer be controlled by 
chains since he snapped out of them, and no man 
had the strength to hold him down. He would howl 
all night and day and gashed his body with stones.
Catching sight of Jesus from a distance, he ran 
up and fell at his feet and shouted at the top of 
his voice: “What do you want with me, Jesus, 
son of the Most High God? In God’s name do 
not torture me!” For Jesus had been saying to 
him, “Come out of the man, unclean spirit”. 
Then he asked, “What is your name?” He 
answered, “My name is Legion, for there are 
many of us”. And he begged him earnestly not 
to send them out of the district. Now on the 
mountainside there was a great herd of pigs 
feeding and the unclean spirits begged him, 
“Send us to the pigs, let us go into them”. So he 
gave them leave. With that, the unclean spirits 
came out and went into the pigs, and the herd 
of about two thousand pigs charged down the 
cliff into the lake, and they were drowned. (Mark 
5, 2–14; Luke 8, 26–34)
I am interested in the exchange between Jesus and 
the possessed during the rite. Jesus told the unclean 
spirit to come out of the man. Then he asked the 
possessed: “What is your name?” The possessed 
man answered: “My name is Legion, for there are 
many of us.”35) It is obvious that Jesus’ question is 
most relevant to the present discussion. Why did 
Jesus ask for “the name” of the evil spirits? What 
does knowing the spirits’ names have anything to do 
with exorcism?
  In a number of cultures, the connection between 
the person and his/her name is profound. Perhaps 
this is because a name is a part of the self and needs 
to be kept in secret to protect the person from dark 
and dangerous magic. A traditional song of the 
Hausa tribe contains the words: “Dear God, please 
forgive me. I have said things in my husband’s 
name....” In other cultures, especially in families that 
have lost many children in childbirths, parents 
decided to name their newborns with ugly names to 
prevent the demons from taking the children’s lives. 
In the Grimm Brothers’ Rumpelstiltskin, the tale deals 
with the power of name. When the evil sorcerer’s 
name is known, he could be called out and his 
power evaporated. In other stories, calling out names 
can bring about spirits from the dark world lies 
beyond.36) In several Hollywood film renditions on 
exorcism, the priests who perform the rite must find 
ways to get the evil spirits to reveal their names. 
Once successful, the power of possession declines 
or simply vanishes. The question is why is (revealing) 
“name” that powerful?
Adam
“Naming/knowing name/erasing name/changing 
name” are the ways by which power relations could 
be established. In sacred books of the past, “know-
ing names” is important. But because names may 
not specifically relate to the person/thing at the time 
it comes into being, it is difficult to guess the correct 
name of a person.37) At the founding moment when 
someone or something is named, it is done with 
despotic authority because the person named is not 
in symmetric power relations with the one who gives 
him/her the name. In this sense, a “name” is an eso-
teric knowledge that “others” do not know unless 
being told by the name giver directly, or traces of 
information about the name left as clues for the 
named themselves or to those interested to explore.
  In Al-Qur’an,38) when God created human, He told 
all his angels that “I am putting a successor on 
earth,” they said, “How can You put someone there 
who will cause damage and bloodshed when we 
celebrate Your praise and proclaim Your holiness?” 
but He said, “I know things you do not” (2, 30). He 
taught Adam the names of all things, then He 
showed them to the angels and said, “Tell me the 
names of these if you truly think you can” (2, 31).
  When the angels could not because they “have 
knowledge only of what You have taught us.” God 
said to Adam: “Adam, tell them the names of these.” 
When he told them their names, God said, “Did I not 
tell you that I know what is hidden in the heavens 
and the earth, and that I know what you reveal and 
what you conceal?” (2, 33)
  The verses from Al-Qur’an show that Adam is 
superior to other beings God created because Adam 
023
C
enter for Southeast Asian Studies K
yoto U
niversity
has “knowledge.” Adam’s knowledge is to know “the 
names of all things.” Knowing names is important 
and powerful for two reasons. First, these names are 
not known to anyone but God, the Name Giver. In 
Islam, God is the culmination of all knowledge Him-
self. Second, that God chose to tell/teach Adam this 
knowledge through revelation is to establish human’s 
hegemonic power over all angels. The Adam who 
knows “the names of all things” is a different Adam. 
Adam has been changed by the power to know the 
names of all things, a power bestowed upon him by 
the Name Giver who is believed to be the Sole Cre-
ator of the universe.
Celestial Axe
I began this keynote address with the story of how 
the state used the power of naming to alter the life of 
an individual who might belong to a different cultural 
tradition of naming, giving her a new name to begin 
a new life. But not only does the state have the 
power to alter a person’s life, its naming power could 
also be a deadly blow to many.
  During the 1970s, there were a series of brutal vio-
lent incidents perpetrated by state officials against 
communist insurgents in Southern Thailand espe-
cially in the province of Pattalung. The most notori-
ous is widely known as the “red barrel” incident. 
Government officials would arrest those they 
accused of being communist insurgents or sympa-
thizers. They would be interrogated, then knocked 
unconscious and thrown into 200-liter oil barrels. 
These barrels were generally red in color. Then they 
would be burned inside. Those who were already 
dead would naturally burn quietly, but those who 
were still alive would howl with excruciating pain into 
the night. The soldiers in charge would drown the 
victims’ voice with the noise of their truck engines. 
The bodies would later be dumped into a nearby 
canal.39)
  There are two groups of victims inside these red 
barrels. There were the insurgents’ relatives, friends 
or acquaintances. These people were interrogated to 
find out the whereabouts of those hidden in the jun-
gles. Then there were those whose names appeared 
in official lists, oftentimes provided by government 
informers. There were two problems with this group 
of victims. First, the names which appeared on the 
list could belong to insurgents who did take up arms 
to fight the government at the time. But there were 
also names which appeared on the list because of 
personal conflicts with the informers. Second, and 
this is most relevant here, there were those who were 
interrogated, tortured, and later killed because their 
names were the same as, or sound similar to, the 
insurgents’ on the list. Sometimes there appeared 
the same names but with different family names. 
Those with these “wrong” names were also rounded 
up and ended up dead by being burnt in the red bar-
rels for a crime they did not commit.40)
  Put another way, an act of naming by the state 
could engender life or death over its citizens. How 
could one describe such deadly naming power? 
There is an apt description hidden in the legal history 
of Ayutthaya.
  During the reign of King Borommkot or Boromma-
rachathirat III of Ayutthaya (1733–58), there was a 
royal edict with the following description of its power:
... Somdej Phramaha Kasatriya rules the Land 
because he is the assumed god (deva) with the 
power to turn the world upside down.41) If Som-
dej Phramaha Kasatriya passes an edict on any 
affair, it is as if a Celestial Axe is thrown. If 
touched by its might, trees and mountains will 
no longer stand, but destroyed. If an edict pro-
claimed to prohibit anything, such will come to 
pass... 42)
We are told that the King’s edict in this law should be 
thought of as the mighty “celestial axe” with enor-
mous destructive power. The “celestial axe” is the 
sovereign power which could create and destroy, 
make something-anything- appear as well as vanish.
A Man Named “Puey”
When Puey Ungpakorn (1916–99), the respected 
former governor of the Bank of Thailand and Rector 
of Thammasat University, finished his Ph.D. from the 
London School of Economics (LSE), he returned 
home to serve then as a Financial Ministry civil ser-
vant. That was under the government of Field Mar-
shal Pibunsongkhram who became a Prime Minister 
after the 1947 coup d’etat. One day the Field Mar-
shal asked him:
“Khun Puey, you are now a high ranking govern-
ment official, when will you change your name 
into Thai?”
The respected economist answered: “My name was 
given to me by my father. My father was already 
dead so I could not ask him to give me a new name. 
Moreover, Your Excellency must have been to Lam-
pang (a province in the North). When you travel by 
train, you must have remembered that there is a train 
station there named ‘Paeng Puey.’ So (Puey) must 












  As a matter of fact, the name “Puey” is Chinese and 
was given to him by his father. It means “earth at the 
base of a tree.” But I think there are many issues one 
could reflect on Puey’s response to the absolute 
power at the time.
  First, Puey’s answer fixes the power of naming 
within a familial relationship, and does not allow out-
side sovereign power to penetrate, let alone to 
change it. That’s why he told the Field Marshal that it 
was his father who named him and he was no more. 
Second, Puey certainly knew what language his 
name was and his answer about the name of a train 
station in Lampang named “Paeng Puey” does not in 
any sense mean that “Puey” is a Thai word as the 
Field Marshal might have wondered. Puey’s answer 
in fact shows that one does not need to think or see 
the word “Puey” only as a Chinese word. But one 
could accept that the name “Puey” is a language 
that has long been in existence in Thai society, 
though it might not be the central Thai language pre-
ferred by the state. Third, it could be argued that the 
reason why Puey refused to change his name is 
because he wished to retain his self autonomy rather 
than allowing the person with state power to have 
his wish. To insist on retaining the “name” given to 
him by his father rather than changing it before the 
seemingly limitless power of someone holding state 
power is an act of resistance of a gentleman who 
longed for freedom and peace within himself.
  In this sense, the politics of naming has to include 
resistance to the naming power sometimes issued 
by the seemingly mighty celestial axe.
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32) I am thinking of Botticelli’s “The Three Miracles of St. Zeno-
bius” displayed at the National Gallery, London.
33) Venetia Newall, The Encyclopedia of Witchcraft & Magic 
(New York: Dial Press, 1974), p. 81.
34) This story appears in three of the gospels: Matthew, Luke, 
and Mark but not in John. The account in Matthew is less 
detailed than what can be read from gospels according to 
Luke and Mark.
35) The New Jerusalem Bible (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1985), p. 1666. In Thai, the language used is incom-
parable: มันตอบว่า “ชื่อกอง, เพราะว่าพวกข้าพเจ้าหลายตนด้วยกัน” 
(Mun torb wa “Chue Kong, proh wa puak kappachao lai ton 
duay gun”), The Christian Bible Containing the Old Testa-
ment and the New Testament (Bangkok: Thai Christianity 
Association, 1992), Part Two on The New Testament, p. 
103.
36) Newall, The Encyclopedia of Witchcraft & Magic, p. 124.
37) For example in Thailand a person named Moo (Piggy) needs 
not be fat. But because the word Moo (pig) is predetermined 
to refer to an animal which is generally fat. Naming fat people 
Moo therefore follows.
38) The Qur’an, M.A.S. Abdel Haleem (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 7.
39) Jularat Damrongvithitham, Red Barrels: Historical Recon-
struction and Haunted Memory in Thai Society (Bangkok: 
Thammasat University Press, 2016), p. 76. (In Thai)
40) Ibid., p. 77.
41) Here the literal translation would be turning “the superiors 
into inferiors and vice versa.”
42) Dr. Bradley’s Thai Laws cited in Sombat Chantornvong, Cri-
tique of Political Literature and History (Bangkok: Kobfai, 
1997), p. 326. (In Thai)
43) S. Sivaraksa, Puey Ungpakorn: The Trustful Elder (Bangkok: 
Komol Keemthong Foundation, 2014), p. 14. (In Thai)
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Excavating the Hidden Politics 
of Land Governance in Laos
Miles Kenney-Lazar
Hakubi Assistant Professor/ CSEAS, Kyoto University
Villagers identify lands expropriated for a pulpwood plantation.
Over the past decade, rural areas of Laos have experienced rapid agrarian and environmental 
changes as the government has granted land and 
resource concessions to domestic and foreign inves-
tors. Over 1.1 million hectares (ha) of “state” land 
have been leased for agriculture, tree plantation, and 
mining projects (Schönweger et al. 2012),1) equiva-
lent to five percent of the national territory. Such land, 
despite being legally managed by the state, is cus-
tomarily occupied, used, and managed by Lao peas-
ants, especially ethnic minority groups (Dwyer 2007). 
Losing access to agricultural and forest lands, as 
well as the multitude of resources contained within, 
has threatened the viability of their rural livelihoods 
(Baird 2010; Barney 2011; Kenney-Lazar 2012; 
Laungaramsri 2012; Suhardiman et al. 2015).
  Development organizations and the popular media 
often contend that a lack of state sovereignty or 
weak governance enables such transformations as 
the Lao government is unable to control its politically 
and economically dominant Chinese and Vietnamese 
neighbors. For example, in a recent video from Al 
Jazeera (Le Gouil et al. 2017) on the impacts of Chi-
nese investments in northern Laos, the narrator 
authoritatively states that Laos is “fast becoming a 
Chinese province, an unofficial colony.” Similarly, the 
watchdog NGO Global Witness (2013, 13) argues 
that Vietnamese “rubber barons” establishing planta-
tions in southern Laos operate in a “chaotic and 
opaque ‘free-for-all’ due to lack of political will and 
weak rule of law.” While such accounts contain an 
element of truth, they are blind to the multitude of 
internal and often contradictory politics and power 
relations among foreign investors, the Lao state, and 
Lao peasants that actually shape access to land and 
drive agrarian-environmental change.
Hidden Land Politics in Laos
In my doctoral dissertation and ongoing research at 
CSEAS, I seek to excavate these politics. Excavation 
is necessary as Lao politics are oftentimes not readily 
observable but lie beneath the surface and must be 
unearthed with time, patience, and ongoing engage-
ment. Lao peasants and government officials are in 
no way apolitical. Instead, their reticence reflects a 
deep understanding of the sensitivity and danger of 
talking and engaging in politics and thus they do so 
with caution. In order to reveal these hidden politics, 
I employed a painstaking and oftentimes politically 
uncomfortable approach of simultaneously working 
and engaging with potentially antagonistic groups, 
including government agencies at multiple adminis-
trative levels, NGOs and land rights activists, 
impacted villages and households, and industrial tree 
plantation companies.
  Over the course of 20 months of ethnographic 
fieldwork, I analyzed the ways in which Quasa-
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Fig. 1  Map of granted concession areas to Quasa-Geruco and Sun Paper. Source: Author’s drawing.
Geruco, a Vietnamese state-owned rubber plantation 
enterprise, and Sun Paper, a private Chinese pulp-
wood plantation company, sought to acquire land for 
their projects in eastern Savannakhet, Southern Laos 
(see Fig. 1) and how this was resisted by some com-
munities and mediated by the state. I immediately 
learned that there were significant variations in each 
company’s ability to acquire land, especially across 
different types of village territories, due to uneven 
power relations among peasant, state, and capital 
actors. The remainder of the research was con-
cerned with revealing of what exactly these political 
relations were comprised. In the rest of this short 
essay, I cover three sites of land politics in Laos: a 
fragmented and contradictory state, the friction of 
state-capital relations, and the blurred boundaries 
between village and state land ownership.
Internal Politics of a Fragmented State
It is a truism of social theory that the state cannot be 
assumed to be a black box or a unified actor, but 
that it must be understood in all of its internal frag-
mentation and contradictions, external ties, and 
embeddedness within society (Marinetto 2007). A 
Gramscian-inspired approach further views the state 
as a social relation and thus also as a site of strategic 
action, where class struggles play out (Jessop 1990). 
Thus, the state is a site of politics, even in one-party 
states like Laos.
  One such contradictory relation within the Lao state 
is between the central and local (provincial, district, 
and village) administrative scales of government. 
While the central government approves and grants 
large-scale concessions, like the 8,650 ha awarded 
to Quasa-Geruco and the 7,324 ha for Sun Paper, 
this is done largely absent of meaningful consultation 
or land use and ownership surveys with local govern-
ment agencies who are most knowledgeable of the 
situation on the ground. Yet, such local authorities, 
especially at the district level, are the ones responsi-
ble for actually finding and securing the land granted 
to the concessionaires as well as convincing or 
coercing villagers to concede parts of their commu-
nity territories to such projects. Although district gov-
ernment officials are under orders to fulfill concession 
contracts, they are also sympathetic to the concerns 
of the villagers for whose well-being they are partly 
responsible.Thus, they often find themselves stuck in 
the middle of political pressures from central level 
ministries, plantation companies, and wary villagers, 
embodying how the state operates as a site of stra-
tegic action among multiple actors.
The Friction of State-capital Relations
Plantation companies can either exploit these internal 
state politics to their advantage or be burdened by 
them. Quasa-Geruco expertly achieved the former 
by developing close relations with the district govern-











local state power to coercively separate peasants 
from their land. While bribery was essential to such 
mobilization, more important was how they used 
corruption to develop personal relationships of reci-
procity, such as by establishing a small rubber plan-
tation on the district governor’s land for free and 
financially supporting a land official’s daughter’s stud-
ies in Vietnam.
  Sun Paper, on the other hand, was caught by the 
friction of an awkward relationship with the district 
government, the importance of which it failed to 
value. Assuming that the contract they signed with 
the central-level government guaranteed their access 
to land, they let government officials take the lead in 
acquiring land for them. When villagers resisted, the 
company was surprised that district officials would 
do little to resolve the issue in their favor. As a district 
official aptly summed up, this was partly due to how 
they treated local officials. He remarked that “they 
don’t take care of us like Quasa does” and that they 
are “stingy, they don’t give anything to villagers or 
district officials, beyond what is required by the regu-
lations.” Out of frustration, the district government 
asked Sun Paper to arrange their own land deals 
with communities or enter into contract farming 
arrangements with individual households. However, 
neither of these approaches were attractive to most 
villagers as they lacked the ideological and coercive 
weight of state power. Ultimately, Sun Paper could 
only plant trees on less than half of the land initially 
granted to them.
Blurred State-village Boundaries
Villagers also engage with the internal politics of the 
state when they wish to defend access to land. 
Despite the coercive pressure placed upon villages 
that drove many of them to concede their lands, few 
if any villages were convinced that it was a good idea 
to do so and many sought to resist the expropriation 
of their lands as much as possible. One avenue avail-
able for villagers to engage in a politics of control 
over land is to debate the meanings and boundaries 
of “state” versus “village” land. The common under-
standing that all land in Laos is owned by the state 
(e.g. Lund 2011) misreads the complexity of land 
relations in the country. The legal framework states 
that land is owned by the “national community” but 
is managed by the state. While many interpret this to 
mean that the state effectively owns all land within 
the country, it can also be interpreted in other ways 
on the ground to argue that villagers are part of that 
national community and that because the village is 
the lowest level of government authority, villagers 
have the right to play a role in owning and managing 
such lands. One village leader cogently summarized 
this complex situation of joint village/state land own-
ership and its accompanying ambiguities by noting 
that “This isn’t only village land, it also belongs to the 
state, but we live here, we protect it (pok pak hak sa 
in Lao language), we are the owners (hao pen chao).”
  The Lao legal framework provides that the state 
allocates land use rights to individuals, which are fully 
protected when a permanent land title is issued but 
can also be partially recognized by other forms of 
documentation like temporary land use certificates or 
even land tax receipts. Thus, demonstrating that vil-
lage territory is occupied and in use by households 
for agricultural production — and is on a path 
towards private ownership — can wrest such land 
away from the ambiguous boundaries of state/village 
land ownership. While villagers interviewed did not 
have formal title to their lands, several villages effec-
tively applied a strategy of discursively framing land 
communal/state lands as individual plots to be used 
by the next generation. This type of reserved land (din 
chap chong) is a customary form of land manage-
ment that, although not formally documented, can 
act as a powerful mechanism for demonstrating a 
village’s drive to expand agricultural production in 
ways amenable to state concepts of modern devel-
opment (see Fig. 2).
  Politics permeate these three sites — within, 
between, and at the boundaries of the state, the 
company, and the village — and play a decisive role 
in shaping access to land in the face of large-scale 
plantation development. They demonstrate that the 
structural forces of capitalist expansion via coercive 
dispossession, otherwise known as land grabbing, 
are contingent upon the grounded politics over land 
among a variety of involved actors. Unearthing such 
politics of land is critically important for understand-
ing contemporary processes of agrarian and environ-
mental change across Southeast Asia. It is also 
essential for identifying pressure points for action and 
change that puts greater control over land in the 
hands of the rural people who live and work there.
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The Businessification of Civil Society 
Kevin Hewison
Former Fellow, CSEAS
A vibrant civil society is usually considered a mea-sure of democratization. In assessing democra-
tization and civil society, it is often the nature of the 
relationship between civil society and the state that is 
considered vital. Authoritarian states limit the space 
where civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) can operate and 
democratically-inclined governments are considered 
more receptive of demands from civil society actors 
and allow CSOs considerable space to operate. The 
very notion of an NGO suggests both a relationship 
with the state and a distance from the state and its 
controls. In terms of politics, in both democratic and 
authoritarian states, civil society and NGOs have of-
ten been seen as contesting the state’s control of 
political space (see Whaites 2000).
  Yet, by focusing on state and civil society, we are 
neglecting another struggle that involves a contest 
for the control of the organizations of civil society. 
This contest involves civil society and business.
  Business firms are not simply a means to accumu-
late capital. Rather, they are a “concentration of 
power” that is economic, ideological and political 
(Crouch 2004, 30, 43). As such, like civil society, 
business exists in a relationship with the state. In 
recent decades, business has come to dominate the 
state to such an extent that its interests are para-
mount in shaping the state and its affairs. As states 
have confronted declining revenue bases there has 
been a “commercialization” of the state and its ser-
vices. Promoted as “reform” and bringing commer-
cial principles to the “business” of state, the result is 
a commodification of state intervention in critical 
areas such as education, health and welfare. Such 
“reforms” are broadly neoliberal, and fundamentally 
imbued with anti-democratic and technocratic 
notions of managerialism. Firms don’t just dominate 
the economy but have become deeply involved in 
the “running of government” (ibid., 44). The result is 
state services contracted out, a loss of competen-
cies in government, more private sector involvement, 
advice and contracts, and the dominance of busi-
ness models. Business power comes to dominate 
government in a broad process of “businessification.” 
This corporate makeover is complete when busines-
sification results in the combination of processes of 
managerialism, commodification, privatization and 
customerization (Wolin 2008, 146–147).
The Struggle for the Organizations of Civil 
Society
Civil society is undergoing a businessification that 
mirrors the processes seen in the state’s relationship 
with business. Just as that process has been con-
flicted and contested, so it is in civil society.
  The struggle for civil society has at least two signifi-
cant resonances with the contest for the state. First, 
the neoliberal and anti-politics claim that citizens no 
longer need the state is echoed in civil society dis-
courses about the threat the state poses to the 
“grassroots.” And, second, the businessification of 
the state is also a part of a process of extending 
“deep marketization” into the space of civil society 
through the control of ideology and the organizations 
in that space (see Carroll 2012).
  The anti-state/anti-politics rhetoric rings loud in civil 
society. Recently, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, the 
Secretary-General of CIVICUS, a global alliance of 
CSOs and activists from 165 countries, claimed that 
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there is a “renewed period of contestation about the 
acceptable bounds of civil society, the latest mani-
festation of the battle to protect citizens against state 
power” (CIVICUS 2015, 5, emphasis added). Such 
claims fit neatly with neoliberal exhortations that gov-
ernment is best when operating as a combination of 
“stakeholder participation” augmented by “problem-
solving efficiency” (see Mair 2013, 15). Calls for “par-
ticipatory governance,” often a kind of anti-politics 
declaration, have been widely taken up in CSOs. Yet, 
participation is usually defined in terms of “appropri-
ate” decision-making. In authoritarian regimes, this 
might be progressive, but in democratizing regimes, 
decision-making facilitated by quasi-technocratic 
NGOs has the potential to undermine elections, rep-
resentation, delegated power, politicians and political 
parties. Notions of technocratic decision-making 
suggest that it is not just states and politicians that 
cannot be trusted, but voters themselves.
  Interestingly, business is neglected in the civil soci-
ety fight to protect citizens from state power and 
venal politicians. To be sure, there has been an anti-
business rhetoric among NGOs, yet criticism of busi-
ness is declining as NGOs cooperate with business 
(and government) on a vast scale and themselves 
become more business-like.
  As governments withdraw from service provision 
and delivery, it is often NGO “partners” that are con-
tracted to deliver these, complete contract research 
and deliver other services required by donor and 
recipient governments. Often, these “projects” are 
not those that NGOs might have chosen if they had 
their own funding streams. Increasingly, NGOs find 
themselves engaged in competitive markets and 
wound up in the red tape of accountability required 
by businessified government agencies. This leads to 
another trend in businessification: working with pri-
vate donors, perceived as easier to deal with than 
state agencies.
  When CSOs link with businessified government 
agencies, businesses and foundations, they find 
themselves competing with the private sector on 
claims of who is better at implementing projects, 
delivering services and doing more for poverty allevi-
ation. As state agencies engage in competitive bid-
ding they become “a shopper for the cheapest 
means of delivery, indifferent about whether it con-
tracts a CSO or a business, although businesses 
may be preferred because they are less likely to raise 
difficult questions” (CIVICUS 2015, 153). Yet busi-
ness is not just a competing “supplier.” There is an 
emerging discourse that argues for the recognition of 
“the power of the private sector to transform the lives 
of poor people” (Mitchell 2011). Business executives 
proclaim their capacity for getting the development 
job done. Business is claimed to be an efficient 
“developer,” having a critical role in poverty alleviation 
(Wales 2014).
  Claims that firms and entrepreneurs can drive 
development are now widely accepted in govern-
ment, international financial institutions and the 
development community. Even when faced with con-
trary evidence, state agencies have been reluctant to 
reconsider self-promoting private sector claims of 
efficiency (ICAI 2015). Norfund, the Norwegian 
Investment Fund for Developing Countries, estab-
lished in 1997, had a portfolio of US$1.7 billion by 
2015, all for “business development.” Norfund is now 
the Norwegian government’s “main instrument for 
combatting poverty through private sector develop-
ment” and seeks to invest in “profitable and sustain-
able” enterprises to “promote business development 
and contribute to economic growth and poverty alle-
viation” (Norfund 2015).
  This businessification of development, welfare and 
other services has also seen the faddish growth of 
social businesses, sustainable markets, social inno-
vation, microfinance, microbusinesses, micro-fran-
chising, social incubators and more (see Wankel 
2008). Indeed, in some accounts, it is “social busi-
ness” that will “save” capitalism (Yunus 2007). In 
another take, such privatized ventures are seen as a 
logical outcomes of capitalism’s economic superiority 
and political victory (Bernstein 2010).
  Social business and social enterprise are coupled 
with “social entrepreneurialism” and touted as bring-
ing business and commercial strategies to bear in 
improving human and environmental well-being (Rid-
ley-Duff and Bull 2011). Such claims see social 
enterprise as a voguish vehicle for philanthropists. 
Some of these rich “developers” describe themselves 
as “evangelists” for social enterprise, displaying can-
do, personalized and individualistic approaches to 
the business of development (see, for example, Skoll 
Foundation 2015). Their wealth and resulting influ-
ence allow them to bring together governments, rock 
stars, venerable educational institutions and other 
celebrity developers to promote their not always suc-
cessful “feel good” causes (see The Economist 
November 5, 2016). “Phi lantrocapital ism” is 
embraced by both businessified governments and 
business people (Hobbes 2014, 3). Anyone who has 
been through Bangkok’s international airport will 
have seen the Thai royal family’s social enterprise 
outlets hawking products from “villagers.” Such 
enterprises are commercial but do as much to pro-
pagandize for the world’s wealthiest monarchy. 
Meanwhile, the grassroots, remain oppressed and 












  Businessification redefines the nature of civil society. 
The space of civil society comes to be conceptual-
ized as composed of individuals rather than collec-
tions of organizations. Thus, those at the grassroots 
become “clients,” “customers,” “entrepreneurs” and 
“key stakeholders” to be surveyed, focus-grouped 
and developed. This turn to individuals reflects a view 
that there is a latent entrepreneurialism at the grass-
roots, waiting to be unleashed. States are required to 
contribute to this by providing an appropriate regula-
tory framework: granting property rights, making 
loans, providing seed capital and other commercial 
inputs. These projects often amount to forms of 
primitive accumulation meant to commodify the 
commons and increase productivity by smallholder 
farms producing for capitalist markets. It is then busi-
nesses or businessified NGOs that lead grassroots 
entrepreneurs to the market.
  As the nature of civil society is redefined by busi-
nessification it changes funding. Some NGOs refuse 
government and corporate funding, but these are a 
small minority. Most now operate in an environment 
where funding has been converted to contracts for 
services and where philanthropy is coming to domi-
nate. Some estimates are that private development 
assistance is now equal to about a third of the ODA 
from DAC members, and that it makes up about a 
quarter of all humanitarian funding (CIVICUS 2015, 
167). While private donations are sometimes seen as 
coming with fewer strings attached, to access these 
funds NGOs must engage in corporate-style market-
ing, advertising and branding, and present an 
agenda that wealthy individuals and foundations find 
palatable, even “exciting.” In other words, agendas 
are shaped by the nature and ideology of donors.
  What does bussinessification mean for CSOs seek-
ing structural change and social justice? What are 
the ethics of accepting funds from the 1% who 
monopolize economic and political power? Certainly, 
where the money comes from is important. Yet fund-
ing independence is increasingly unlikely. As CIVICUS 
(2015, 170–173) observe, a small and powerful 
group of “private foundations commands most 
resources, with the 10 largest private foundations 
providing 60% of all international foundation giving, 
meaning that their decisions on resource allocation 
can be disproportionately influential.” The result is a 
convergence of CSOs and businesses and founda-
tions and a dilution of attention to progressive social 
change.
  The advocates for these processes of bussinessifi-
cation argue that businesses and civil society appre-
ciate a levelling of the playing field:
The rule of law is preferable to the rule of power. 
Predictability trumps disorder. Fairness is better 
than corruption. These statements ring as true 
for business as they do for civil society. Stable, 
ba lanced  env i ronments  a re  be t te r  fo r 
everyone....
It is time that we acknowledge our similarities 
and start working together to achieve this, for 
the benefit of each sector, and for society as a 
whole (Kiai and Leissner 2015, 272).
Working together means competing with each other 
with “market logics” applied to NGOs. This often 
leads to calls for a “rationalization” of the multitude of 
NGOs in the interest of efficiency, evaluation, trans-
parency and good governance; a kind of CSO merg-
ers and acquisitions movement.
Conclusion
The struggle for civil society is a contest that has 
been seen before in the ways in which business has 
come to dominate states. At the same time, the suc-
cessful businessification of the state means that civil 
society is faced with a two-pronged effort, by state 
and business, to businessify the organizations of civil 
society.
  Businessified NGOs will pose few challenges to 
regimes, repressive or democratic. Businessification 
means that CSOs will tend to be supportive of the 
regimes of the day, leading to a narrowing of political 
space. Civil society representation and participation 
is now largely about regulation. Businesses and 
states understand that.
  This is not an argument that civil society is lost or 
that all NGOs have sold out. Rather, this approach 
observes that, for the organizations of civil society, as 
bussinessification takes hold of them, there is a dimi-
nution of activism that contributes to the narrowing 
of political space, the rise of anti-politics and the 
domination of business elites. If the space of civil 
society is being businessified, political strategies 
need to be devised to challenge the trajectory of 
businessification.
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Fig. 1  Interview. Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi with SM vice-district head of KL, 28 July 2016.
Research on Women’s Leadership in Indonesia: 
Women as the Source of Knowledge, New 
Narrative, and Existing Limitations (2006–2017) 
Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi
Senior Researcher, Research Center for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences
The democratized atmosphere of the post-Suhar-to era (after 1998) has provided wider room for 
Indonesian women to expand their political role in a 
number of ways, including participation in direct elec-
tions and securing leadership positions. Since the 
early 1990s, Muslim women activists in Indonesia 
have begun to embrace and spread ideas of Islamic 
feminism through publications and discussions. Sub-
sequently, since the early 2000s, non-state actors 
from academia and women activists began to pro-
mote affirmative action regulations to increase the 
representation of women in parliament. Increasing 
discussions on gender equality in Indonesian Islam 
and civic consolidation to foster government’s policy 
of pro-affirmative action, resulted in voluntarily affir-
mative action being adopted in the 2004 General 
Election. This was followed by firmer affirmative ac-
tion rule combined with the zipper mechanism (male 
and female candidates who would appear alternately 
on party lists) which required at least one woman 
among the top three candidates in the 2009 General 
Election, and then in the 2014 General Election. In 
the forthcoming 2019 General Election, Law No. 
7/2017 article 173, section 2 (e) set the requirement 
that only a political party that is able to fulfil the affir-
mative action rule, where women make up 30 per 
cent of the members of party’s managing officers on 
the central board to compete in the General Election. 
Although the representation of women in the Indone-
sian parliament is still below 30 percent, the vibrant 
discourses surrounding it have provided comfortable 
spaces for greater political participation and the lead-
ership of women, including in Indonesian Islam.
  Machrusah (2005) studied Muslimat Nahdlatul 
Ulama (Muslimat NU), the women’s wing of NU, a 
traditionalist Muslim organization founded in 1926, to 
observe how it negotiated with its male dominated 
parent organization NU for greater gender equality. 
Machrusah concluded that the reinterpretation of 
religious texts is only one part of a discussion in talk-
ing about better gender relations within traditional 
Muslim societies as it also depends on external politi-
cal forces. “'Aisyiyah,” the women’s wing of Muham-
madiyah (the Islamic modernism movement in Indo-
nesia founded in 1912), also proposed women’s 
leadership. Taking an interest in these changes in 
Indonesian society, in 2006, I begin research on 
women’s leadership in Muhammadiyah. My work 
revealed that 'Aisyiyah have demanded for women to 
be included in the Muhammadiyah Central Board 
since the 40th “'Aisyiyah Muktamar” in Surabaya 
1978 (Dewi 2008, 166). Muhammadiyah’s formal reli-
gious perspectives is in favor of women’s leadership; 
in contrast to the majority of Muhammadiyah follow-
ers at wilayah (provincial) and daerah (district) level 
who oppose women’s leadership as they are likely 
dominated by textual approaches in interpreting 
divine messages on women’s leadership. This was 
the case with the 45th Muhammadiyah Muktamar 
held in July 2005, where no women were elected to 
the Central Board of Muhammadiyah (Dewi 2007; 
2008). I concluded that 'Aisyiyah’s demands for 
women’s leadership in Muhammadiyah should con-
sider the changing religious perspectives of Muham-
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madiyah followers in favor of women’s leadership, 
their ability to engage with obstacles from the gen-
dered perspective of Muhammadiyah’s development, 
and from within the context of Javanese culture 
(Dewi 2007; 2008).
  Contemporary discourses and pressure for wom-
en’s leadership in Indonesian Islam, namely NU and 
Muhammadiyah, coincides with the ongoing devel-
opment of local politics. Direct local elections to elect 
heads of local government under the Law No. 
32/2004, was initially implemented in 2005. I have 
argued that structural opportunities for women to be 
recruited into politics have increased under the new 
conditions for direct local elections (Dewi 2015, 8). 
Today, female politicians can move freely among vot-
ers without running into barriers set up by oligarchies 
and male-dominated political parties. This is because 
direct elections have lessened, if not removed, the 
institutional barriers of oligarchic, male-dominated 
political parties, including inside the regional People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah, DPRD), which had been the mechanism 
through which local government heads were elected. 
It is now the voters who decide who wins, and not 
male dominated political elites inside DPRD, who for-
merly elected local leaders. The number of female 
leaders elected via direct local election as governor/
mayor/district heads, have increased significantly in 
which most of them are Muslims in Java, since the 
introduction of direct local elections in 2005. This 
new development is influenced by the increasing 
engagement of Indonesian Muslim women who hold 
Islamic principles. To put it another way, contempo-
rary Indonesian Islam in the post-Suharto era shows 
a waning of political Islam, but a deepening of “social 
Islamization” (Ota et al. 2010, 3–5). Considering this 
context, I suggest that the increasing number of 
female Muslim leaders elected through direct elec-
tions indicates that important changes and develop-
ments have taken place in Indonesia in relation to 
Islam, gender and politics.
  In 2008, I started new research on Muslim women 
political leaders focusing on three Muslim women 
political leaders who won direct local elections in 
Java. The majority of elected Muslim political leaders 
are in Java and Javanese. Observing Indonesia’s 
local politics through the prism of gender, my ongo-
ing research has revealed many positive, yet often 
neglected factors, namely the role of Islam, gender, 
and networks behind the success of Muslim women 
political leaders in direct local elections. Concurrently, 
I have been developing new perspectives on the 
agency of Muslim women in utilizing their individual 
capital (education, social background, gender) (Dewi 
2012; 2015). In particular, I have highlighted two 
mainstream Indonesian Islam organizations, namely 
Muhammadiyah and NU that have similar perspec-
tives and attitudes in supporting women’s leadership 
in local politics, where the three female Javanese 
Muslim political leaders exercise power (Dewi 2015, 
63). Thus, Indonesian Islam provides a strong reli-
gious foundation for Muslim women political leaders 
to expand their leadership in politics and shape the 
growth of  democrat izat ion in  post-Suharto 
Indonesia.
  Finishing my study, I was further driven by curiosity 
to uncover another two factors, piety and sexuality, 
which I did not deeply explore in my earlier research. 
In doing so, in 2016, I observed another four Muslim 
women political leaders’ experiences and narratives, 
who resided in Yogyakarta Province and other sur-
rounding provinces. Research showed that private 
lives and intimate relations, which are greatly shaped 
by Islamic norms, such as wearing the veil and hus-
band-wife relationships, are deliberately brought into 
the public sphere to seek political sympathy. Their 
actions tell us that it is not only the agency of these 
four women that matter; the veil itself is a means of 
agency. The veil, rather than signifying oppression as 
often perceived by western feminist understanding, 
becomes a progressive socio-political tool because it 
gives them comfort in certain spaces to maneuverer 
and participate in the public sphere which is highly 
patriarchal, given the increasing engagement of Indo-
nesian people with Islamic principles and norms in 
the third wave of Islamization in Indonesia (Dewi 
2017a, 344, 354). Wearing a veil, in this case, signi-
fies freedom for Indonesian Muslim women to take 
active part in electoral politics. I also discovered that 
the piety and good sexuality of Muslim women politi-
cal leaders may be only be a very superficial part of 
their attitude, being able to get wider approval and 
power. This finding confirms an earlier analysis of 
three Javanese Muslim women political leaders 
where ideas and norms of Islamic piety in public 
sphere were played upon or used in political cam-
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Fig. 2  Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi interviewing SW district head of BT (2010–2015), 31 July 2016.
(Dewi 2015, 182). This public piety is intermingled 
with sexuality. There are generally widespread norms 
of Indonesian society that perceive heterosexuality as 
the acceptable norm: the four female Javanese Mus-
lim politicians are expected to behave with their 
spouses (husbands) as good wives and mothers, 
and this clearly played out in their political campaigns 
(Dewi 2017a, 354). Although we should be aware of 
the “conservative turn” (van Bruinessen 2013, 3) 
phenomenon of Indonesian Islam, research suggests 
that in local politics, gender is not a significant ele-
ment of contestation that can be used as a primary 
point to attack or hinder Muslim women candidates.
  In-depth research on women’s leadership in Indo-
nesia (2006–2017) suggests the importance of 
updating previous notions regarding female leader-
ship in Asia that rely heavily on the “familial ties” fac-
tor and notion of “moral capital” (Dewi 2017a, 343). I 
suggest that without neglecting the importance of 
personal capabilities, we should consider and pay 
attention to ideas and practices of Islamic piety and 
sexuality in the public sphere to analyze the rise of 
Muslim women’s political leadership in Asian popular 
democracy; in a milieu of Islamization and globaliza-
tion in the twenty-first century where discourses of 
piety and sexuality are becoming increasingly 
dynamic.
  Through years of research, I realize that a feminist 
research methodology, one that focuses on women’s 
personal experiences in a specific context to gain 
knowledge based on their real-life experiences (Hard-
ing 1987, 30), has enabled me to capture not only 
their experiences, but much more. By positioning 
women as a source of knowledge, we can observe 
the correlation between Islam, gender, networks, 
piety, and sexuality in the public sphere of contem-
porary Indonesia. The agency of Muslim women 
political leaders is pivotal. Their thoughts and experi-
ences have produced new narratives of Indonesian 
Muslim women’s roles and positions, namely those 
who actively create opportunities in politics with con-
fidence to embrace and expand new meanings of 
Islamic piety into the public sphere. This is shaping 
the growth and direction of Indonesian democratiza-
tion which was previously mainly dominated by men.
  Nevertheless, academic efforts to promote women’s 
leadership or political research with gender or wom-
en’s perspectives faces contemporary challenges. 
Both the public and academia have higher expecta-
tions toward female political leaders’ commitment 
and achievement toward gender responsive policy. 
Careful analysis is needed in viewing this matter. 
Research has made clear that most female political 
leaders show low commitment or passive roles in 
promoting gender responsive policy, which has been 
influenced by a number of factors such as their per-
sonal experiences, their engagement with women’s 
groups during their quest for power, and their leader-
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ship characteristics (Dewi 2015, 174, 183). Addition-
ally, so far, the majority of female political leaders 
come from strong families ties and political dynasties 
which prevent them from performing progressively in 
a different fashion from male oligarchs (Dewi 2017b). 
Furthermore, there are an increasing number of 
female political leaders who have been jailed due to 
corruption cases (such as in Banyuwangi, Banten, 
Klaten, Tegal, Kutai Kertanegara). Although many 
male political leaders have also been jailed due to 
corruption cases, the public have paid special atten-
tion to the performance of female political leaders. 
This is due to their rise and it is still regarded as a 
new phenomenon which has disrupted a predomi-
nantly male dominated political landscape. This 
development indicates a disparity between academic 
efforts to promote women’s leadership, as well as 
research on politics with a focus on gender and 
women on the actual situation of women’s leaders in 
Indonesia.
  This situation, if not paid enough attention, will 
result in a backlash against the efforts to promote 
women’s leadership in Indonesian politics. Finally, 
one other challenge is to encourage more female 
political leaders from lower class groups to partici-
pate. To date, female political leaders in local politics 
have predominantly come from the middle-class. 
While lower class women usually do not have 
enough resources to compete in direct local election, 
middle class women have acquired better individual 
capital (in the form of education, finance, and skills), 
as well as social capital (networks). These are all 
requirements to compete in direct local elections. 
Certainly, there is still much to do to narrow the 
divide between normative expectations and the 
actual situation of women’s leadership in Indonesia. 
Systematic and continuous effort needed to achieve 
substantive narrative women’s leadership, beyond 
the symbolic narrative of women’s leadership in 
Indonesia.
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A flyer for the third season of the popular Hindi TV drama "Nagin" (Snake Women), dubbed in Thai on Channel 3.
Fresh From the Field:
Translated Media, Trans-regional Encounters: 
Experiencing India in the Lao Highlands 
Nishaant Choksi
 JSPS Postdoctoral Fellow/ CSEAS, Kyoto University
As a JSPS Postdoctoral Fellow whose research primarily focuses on India, I have always felt as a 
slight outlier at the CSEAS, where most research fo-
cuses on Southeast Asia, which as broadly con-
ceived stretches from the Philippines to the Bangla-
desh-Burma border. Although I  am the only 
researcher at CSEAS as far as I know working pri-
marily in India, my research focuses on India’s Aus-
troasiatic languages, minority languages which are 
closely related to the Mon-Khmer languages of main-
land Southeast Asia. My postdoctoral counterpart at 
CSEAS, Nathan Badenoch, has worked for a num-
ber of years on Mon-Khmer languages, particularly in 
the Laos highlands, and also in Myanmar, and re-
cently we together have begun joint projects in India 
as well.
  Since Southeast Asia is not my area of study, I have 
not spent much time in the region. Yet one of the 
advantages of working at CSEAS has been the 
opportunity to explore regions different from my pri-
mary research site, and to explore the longstanding 
connections between different parts of Asia (Japan 
included). Recently I had the opportunity to accom-
pany Professor Badenoch on a trip to his field site in 
Luang Namtha province, Laos, a region far to the 
north of the country that shares a border with Yun-
nan in China. This region is both ethnically and lin-
guistically diverse, home to several of Laos’ ethnic 
minorities. In the villages around Luang Namtha, 
speakers of four major language families (Austro-Asi-
atic, Hmong-Mien, Tibeto-Burman, and Tai-Kadai) 
coexist together, and a type of stable multilingualism 
has emerged. Badenoch has been studying the lan-
guages and the linguistic and ethnic diversity of this 
region for over eight years, and is proficient to vary-
ing degrees in many of the languages spoken there.
  Currently, Badenoch is working mostly with a settle-
ment of speakers of a Mon-Khmer language known 
as Bit. As the language is under-documented, Bade-
noch is in the process of creating a dictionary and 
grammar of the language. I accompanied him to the 
Bit village in February 2018 for a brief visit. As the vil-
lagers could talk freely in their language (through 
Badenoch), they were very friendly and open with 
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Fig. 1  Associate Professor Nathan Badenoch discussing Bit history with village elder 
me. They readily answered questions I had about 
their language, and I drew many comparisons 
between words and cultural concepts in their lan-
guage and in the Austro-Asiatic languages spoken in 
India. They were equally surprised by the close simi-
larities in languages spoken so far apart.
  However, perhaps more interesting than my aca-
demic questions were the villagers’ own questions 
for me, having for the first time seen a person of 
Indian descent in the flesh. “Do you see many snakes 
in India?” “Are you scared of snakes?” “Are snakes in 
India magical?” “Are India people’s origins from 
snakes?” At first I was a bit confused why so many 
villagers, at most of the households we visited, kept 
asking me questions about snakes. I know India was 
famous for cobras and snake charmers, but it is also 
equally known for many other things, so I was curi-
ous why the intense curiosity of everyone on the 
subject of snakes. It soon emerged in conversation 
with the villagers that one of the most popular televi-
sion shows in the village was a Thai-dubbed version 
of the Indian drama Naagin (นาคิน in Thai).
  Naagin was a popular Indian television drama that 
first aired in India in 2015. The story is one of two-
shapeshifting serpent cousin sisters (icchadaari naa-
gin) who seek to avenge the death of their parents. 
Their parents possessed an ancient powerful jewel, 
and were murdered by a gang of thieves. The sisters 
were then raised in a Shiva temple (Shiva is a power-
ful Hindu God, and Lord of Serpents) by a holy man 
(a rishi or sage), and then as they grew older they left 
to kill the thieves and regain possession of the jewel. 
Subsequently a series of events take place, for 
instance the sisters both fall in love with one of the 
kind-hearted human sons of one of the murderers, 
and turn on each other, leading to family and roman-
tic dramas and tensions between serpent and 
human forms. Though the story has mythological 
and Puranic elements it is set in the modern world; 
the characters use mobile phones and drive cars, 
while at the same time using religious incantations, 
casting curses, etc.
  The show was one of the first Indian television dra-
mas to air on Thailand’s Private Channel 3, and 
because, as is typical with many Indian television 
dramas, a large number of episodes were produced, 
it was available as a daily broadcast. As most people 
in Luang Namtha had satellite dishes they received 
Thai television channels, and as a general rule, most 
people in Luang Namtha (and in Laos in general) 
preferred watching Thai-language media. As we 
found out later, not only in the Bit village, but 
throughout Luang Namtha town and the surrounding 
cities, Naagin was extremely popular. Everybody 
either watched it, or expressed regret at not having 
time to watch it. On my way back from the Bit village 
to Luangnamtha city after a day of field work, I 
passed by an open window and peeked inside, and I 
saw a television show lighted up with two snakes 
fighting with a Shiva linga (a statue of the Lord Shiva) 
in the background, and one of the snakes quickly 
morphing into a beautiful woman. The show of 
course was Naagin.
  As Badenoch took me around Luang Namtha and 
explained to me more in depth about the history and 
cultural diversity of the place, I started to see that the 
themes and characters of the Indian television show 
had a far deeper local resonance than simply as an 
exotic curiosity from a remote land. Communities like 
the Bit, and other larger ethnic groups in the region 
like the Khamu and Sida, were not Buddhist but 
practiced forms of animism in which animal spirits 
were important, including snakes, and spirits often 











Fig. 2  Rishi and the Buddha (Photo from Nathan Badenoch)
spirits, called Naak (from the Sanskrit Naga) often 
shape-shifted into women. Hence it was no surprise 
that among animist communities like the Bit, shows 
like Naagin were popular, and though they were 
“supernatural,” resonated with lived experience. The 
Naga of course, as a popular creature from ancient 
Indian mythology, also plays a special role in Bud-
dhism, the dominant religion of Laos.
  Yet though shape-shifting snakes have parallels in 
the Buddhist and animistic worldviews of the resi-
dents of Luang Namtha, there are also some other 
more obscure connections that came to light during 
my brief trip.  For instance, Naagin features bearded 
ascetics, holy men who, in India, are often associ-
ated with the worship of Shiva. Anyone who has vis-
ited the Himalayas in India or Nepal, or any number 
of pilgrimage sites in South Asia, has seen these 
wandering ascetics, and thus they are not so exotic 
for the Indian viewer. They are however a rare sight in 
the Theravada Buddhist cultures of Southeast Asia, 
which does not encourage such type of renunciation. 
Yet, curiously, as Badenoch pointed out to me on a 
trip to Luang Namtha’s major Buddhist temple, Wat 
Samakhixay, one of the major features of the temple 
is a cave-like structure in the back of the main sanc-
tuary at the end of which sits a bearded renunciate (a 
rishi, drawn from the Sanskrit word for sage or seer) 
surrounded by Buddhas. Badenoch’s analysis (in an 
article currently under preparation for the Journal of 
Lao Studies) is that the sage represents the animis-
tic, non-Buddhist cultures of the region, and that the 
cave itself with the Buddhas standing in subordina-
tion, reverses the traditional power relations between 
the highland animistic societies such as the Bit, 
Khamu, or Hmong, and the dominant Buddhist Lao 
and Tai cultures. This is also evidenced by the fact 
that many of the patrons of the temple are 
non-Buddhists.
  In addition to the presence of bearded ascetics in 
the landscape of Luang Namtha, and its connection 
to the minority cultures of the region, there are also 
traces of the ancient worship of Shiva. Before arriving 
in Luang Namtha, I had seen evidence for the wor-
ship of Shiva only in the ancient royal centers of 
Southeast Asia, such as at Angkor or My Son. 
Hence, I was led to believe that this Puranic strata of 
worship was only an elite practice, and therefore 
easily replaced by Theravada Buddhism. While this 
may in some sense be true, I saw that at Luang 
Namtha, when the Buddhist Nyuan came from the 
Chien Mai region to settle the region they built a 
small structure to mark the founding of Luang 
Namtha town. There, they also placed a lak-muang 
(or city pillar) in the shape of what Badenoch consid-
ers to be a Shiva linga, a statue to Shiva. These 
monuments, in combination with the popularity of 
shows such as Naagin which related the stories of 
snakes and the power of bearded sages and inter-
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Fig. 4  The next generation in Bit cultural transmission
Fig. 3  Shiva linga in the monument about the founding of the valley (Photo from Nathan Badenoch)
ventions of the god Shiva on the snakes’ behalf, 
formed a spectrum of Indic influence that spanned 
both the ancient and the modern, and revealed pos-
sible connections between the animistic life-ways of 
the region and Indic mytho-poetics that are not 
attributable to dominant Buddhist worldviews.
  Finally, talk about Naagin also brought to light the 
larger history of Indian media in the region. For 
instance, during a long five-hour lunch at the Bit vil-
lage, which included several bottles of Lao beer and 
some buffalo sashimi, Badenoch reminded his Bit 
friends how in one story he had recorded one of the 
older gentleman recalling the unbelievable beauty of 
the heroine as “the top beauty of all India.” Badenoch 
said he was surprised as to why the narrator brought 
up specifically “Indian” woman as a standard for 
beauty. However most of the villagers understood 
immediately that the narrator was referencing Indian 
film actresses. They said that in the 1980s and 
1990s, before television sets or satellite dishes 
streamed Thai television into the homes of villagers 
(and Thai-dubbed Indian television) the only exposure 
to cinema was traveling film shows which showed 
primarily Indian movies. Villagers would spend hefty 
sums to go see the movies, and would recall songs 
and dance scenes and of course the “beauty” of the 
actresses who graced the screen. Thus Indian cin-
ema itself has a longer history than one might expect 
in the Laos highlands, and for many, it was the first 
exposure to televisual media. In a time of satellite 
dishes, and endless television programming stream-
ing from the Bangkok-based channels, the popularity 
of the Indian show Naagin brings forth an interesting, 
little discussed history of cross-regional connections 
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